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ABSTRACT 
Evaluating the inherently relative and subjective social value of employment needs to be placed within 
a broader inquiry about the conditions under which a sufficient and sustained perception of social value 
might be cultivated within particular employment settings, in a manner that is adaptive and resilient to 
the often profound structural transformations associated with socio-economic development. This paper 
contends that these conditions are intricately related to redistributive processes within societies. A vital 
role of public policy is to strengthen progressive redistributive institutional mechanisms as a means to 
cultivate resilience and positive synergies between the social values of employment, and human and 
economic development. This argument is made in four sections, including: some stylized facts of 
contemporary population growth and labour transitions across the global South; the limitations of 
standard economics approaches in dealing with issues of labour market intermediation and 
employment regulation as well as a variety of alternative socially and institutionally embedded views; 
the valuation of labour, drawing from the example of care work to illustrate the importance of 
redistributive mechanisms to socialize the costs of relatively skilled service sector employment; and 
lastly, some examples of the redistributive imperative in contemporary development. The conclusion 
offers some reflections on structural vulnerabilities in a context of labour transitions and human 
development. 
 
Introduction 
After years of neglect, the theme of employment has returned to the forefront of the international 
development agenda, appropriately following on the heels of the global financial crisis and its 
aftermath. Prominent examples include the 2010 Trade and Development Report (UNCTAD 2010), 
the report Combating Poverty and Inequality: Structural Change, Social Policy and Politics 
(UNRISD 2010) and the 2013 World Development Report (World Bank 2012), in addition to the 
ongoing extensive work on employment by the International Labour Organization, which had never 
lost the ball. Within this revived attention, there has been recognition of the social value of 
employment, which brings this theme close to the heart of the human development approach. For 
instance, the World Bank (2012) highlights what it calls the ‗social value‘ of jobs, which it presents as 
the individual value of a job plus its various spillover effects, whether negative, such as 
environmental costs, or positive, such as social identity, sense of fairness, agglomeration effects, 
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global integration or gender equality.1 It logically notes that the individual and social values of jobs 
can differ.  
This way of understanding ‗social value‘ essentially amounts to a social utility function in which 
the aggregation of individual utilities can amount to more or less than their sum. It appears to be 
adapted from the idea of social opportunity costs in welfare economics, in which private opportunity 
costs are considered together with the wider externalities of using resources for specific purposes, 
and hence the opportunity costs are for society rather than for the individual. As one result of this 
influence, the conception of ‗social value‘ becomes convoluted as to whether ‗social‘ should be treated 
as society, aggregating all utilities including the economic, or as in sociology, such as with regard to 
the fundamentally social nature of basic needs, which are conceivable with both individual and 
societal dimensions.2  
In relating the social values of employment to human development, the idea of ‗social value‘ 
arguably needs to be anchored in the latter sociological conception, rather than through the 
reductionist lenses derived from utilitarian welfare economics, which proponents of the human 
development approach have consistently sought to overcome. The question of social value might 
even be reversed to investigate the social processes involved in the valuing of labour. This would 
complicate concepts such as ‗productivity‘ and ‗inclusion‘, which are largely taken for granted in 
mainstream development agendas. Moreover, understanding social value requires a reflection on 
evolving social needs within broader development processes, beyond absolute conceptions of 
poverty, whether money-metric or multidimensional. Lastly, a fuller appreciation is needed of how 
redistributive mechanisms have been intricately involved in creating conditions for sufficient and 
sustained social values of employment to be cultivated within development processes. Such 
appreciation has been neglected in mainstream development agendas given the undue influence of 
                                                          
1 For instance, see p.17 of World Bank (2012). It represents jobs in protected sectors as having wholly negative 
spillover effects, and jobs connected to global value chains as having wholly positive spillover effects. This 
reproduces standard World Bank biases regarding industrial policy and global integration.  
2 World Bank (2012) lacks clarity on whether social values refer to individual versus societal (aggregate) values, or 
whether these refer to social versus economic values. In the 2013 World Development Report, the ‗individual 
value‘ is presumably the wage value of the job, although the report is not clear why many of the social values that 
it describes might not also be individual values. Similarly, in its conception of social values, the report appears to 
include both economic aspects such as costs and poverty reduction (the latter presumably as a shared social 
objective rather than as the direct consequence of receiving a wage, otherwise it would amount to double 
counting), as well as sociological aspects such as identity. Again, this appears to reflect the influence of the idea 
of social opportunity costs in which ‗social‘ simply refers to aggregation. Most of the disciplines that the report 
proposes for measuring the difference between individual and social values derive from the field of economics 
(e.g., see p. 160). 
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orthodox welfare economics, which induces an impulse to view redistribution as market interference 
rather than as an intrinsic component of modern development.  
This paper explores these principles through a focus on structural and institutional factors that 
condition the social value of employment and their relation to human development. Social values in 
this sense are best understood as referring to the non-pecuniary benefits derived from employment, 
keeping in mind that economies are embedded within social relations. These benefits can be 
conceived in individual terms, such as a sense of security, life fulfilment, self-worth and dignity, or in 
societal terms, such as the fostering of social cohesion by providing a platform for individuals to 
engage with their community in a manner that engenders a sense of identity and belonging to a 
collective endeavour and shared social objectives. In other words, work is valued for multifaceted 
reasons and serves multifaceted functions, some of which are clearly economic (understood in a 
restrictive sense of value added and remuneration) and many of which are not. It is in this range of 
values and functions, both economic and social, that we must seek to understand the place of 
employment within human development. This understanding is non-controversial, although it is 
notably distinct from the more problematic lexicon of ‗social capital‘, or from recent renditions of the 
idea of ‗social development‘ articulated by the World Bank, which basically instrumentalizes a 
‗Putnamian‘ version of social capital theory.  
As an equally non-controversial corollary, the creation or destruction of employment carries 
social and human development consequences that go beyond the micro- or macroeconomic calculus 
of wages, incomes, economic externalities and/or aggregate demand in an economy. Current 
inclusive growth agendas at both the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) emphasize principles of labour market inclusion and labour productivity, both of which beg 
the questions: what kinds of inclusion, and what ways of increasing labour productivity? Some types 
of employment might contribute more to social values and human development than their economic 
value would suggest, as in the case of a rural community health worker. Other types of employment 
might be detrimental to social values or human development even while contributing to economic 
growth, such as exploitative child labour.  
Similarly, the general consensus is that unemployment should be avoided as a matter of urgency 
so that it does not destabilize social cohesion or imperil human development, among other 
considerations. Debate then typically revolves around whether deregulated labour markets or 
government job creation programmes are better suited to meet the challenge. A common 
compromise position—labour market activation policies—has been controversial, given that the more 
punitive versions of these policies have had detrimental effects on people‘s dignity or social status by 
forcing them to accept substandard employment mismatched with their skill sets, or else by being 
used as a device to discipline welfare recipients. Moreover, while unemployment would generally be 
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considered detrimental to social cohesion, some job loss could nonetheless provide incentives and 
opportunities for dynamism within both economic and human development, at least under 
circumstances where sufficient social security provides workers with an ability to maintain a degree 
of autonomy from the labour market—what Esping-Anderson (1990) refers to as decommodification. 
For instance, spells of unemployment might encourage the unemployed to return to school (if 
schooling options for mature students are affordable and accessible) and to reskill themselves, 
possibly resulting in increased social mobility, esteem and income. Under such circumstances, 
autonomy and the ability to be unemployed could be a source of dignity and advantage. In most 
developing countries that lack any significant degree of generalized social security, unemployment is 
generally a status that only relatively well-off people can afford.  
By the few examples already given, it is obvious that social values of employment cannot be 
understood in abstraction from broader structural and institutional settings. Moreover, evaluating 
social values is very difficult to do in practice, in part because they cannot be monetized and hence 
compared to money-metric values. The whole conceptual artifice of ‗utilities‘ involves the same 
problem insofar as it relies on the fairly tautological ploy of ‗revealed preferences‘. As a result, we 
need to be careful in making evaluative and aggregative statements regarding the comparison of 
social values to economic values. This goes without saying in the case of unpaid care work, in which 
extremely important social and economic values and functions are not reflected at all by monetary 
compensation. It also applies to paid work, whether the payment is determined by the marginal 
productivity of labour or by other factors. While paid work definitely bears a range of social values 
for individuals and societies, these values cannot necessarily be measured and compared with wage 
and other monetary economic values.   
A more fundamental reason for the difficulty in comparing social and economic values is that the 
causal relationship between the two remains poorly understood, and, if postulated, is hugely debated 
on empirical, theoretical and ideological grounds. The utilitarian welfare economics approach to this 
question would be that the social value of employment, understood at the individual level, is imputed 
by its monetary market value: If people derive utility from the social dimensions of employment, this 
will be reflected in the wage bargain that they negotiate on the labour market as ‗revealed 
preferences‘, although this transmission can be partially disrupted by market distortions or 
externalities. The problem with this explanation is that it results in a circular logic. It is particularly 
problematic in real world contexts where people are compelled to work and not necessarily free to 
withdraw from a hypothesized labour market bargain, whether their compulsion is driven by 
absolute poverty or else by more nuanced processes of social conditioning and relative social needs. 
A political economy approach might question whether or not the processes that drive the 
continuously increasing productivity associated with modern economic growth necessarily reinforce 
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the social value of employment. The classical Marxist answer to this question is that capitalist 
processes are fundamentally alienating for labour, although the resultant dialectic of class conflict is 
precisely what makes capitalism so dynamic, rather than any presumed harmony between social and 
economic values. As pointed out by Arrighi (2007, pp. 50–52), even Adam Smith viewed the division 
of labour within production units as both improving the productive powers of labour while also 
having a deleterious effect on the moral and intellectual qualities of the labour force due to the 
specialization of work into monotonous and uniform tasks. This tension can be understood as 
undermining the social value of employment within increasingly complex and atomized factory 
systems of production and distribution, such as with the ‗Walmartization‘ of retail stores across the 
global North and South today.   
Even more fundamental is the fact that social values are inherently relative as well as subjective, 
derived from the sense of security and dignity that people perceive from particular social and 
economic settings. Unlike objective human development metrics, social values plausibly share 
similar characteristics as the ‗hedonic‘ and ‗aspiration‘ treadmills of happiness identified in 
happiness studies (e.g., Easterlin 1974), or more than two millennia earlier in Buddhism as the 
‗suffering of change‘. Perceptions of security, dignity or social cohesion invariably adapt to changing 
contexts. The perception of certain types of work as enhancing security or dignity in a rural agrarian 
context, for instance, might not persist through the course of urbanization, to the extent that, as 
noted by White (2011, p. 1), ―Mounting evidence from all over the world suggests strongly that young 
people are increasingly uninterested in farming or in rural futures.‖ An understanding of social 
values as social and as fundamentally relative and subjective requires a more complex understanding 
than that offered by the economistic utilitarian framework of welfare economics of the ways that 
values and structural transformations interact, in particular in a global setting, and in relation to how 
labour is organized and valued within and across societies. 
This paper contends that these interactions are intricately related to redistributive processes 
within societies. A vital role of public policy within development is to strengthen progressive 
redistributive institutional mechanisms as means to cultivate resilience and positive synergies 
between social values of employment, and human and economic development. Such cultivation 
occurs principally by way of socializing the wealth produced by increasing productivity in order to 
support forms of employment that would be deemed socially valuable and that would reinforce other 
human development gains, such as in education. The contemporary development context of 
increasing productivity within fragmented albeit increasingly concentrated networks of global 
production and distribution, together with the tertiarization of labour forces across the global South, 
has resulted in a situation whereby links between productivity and labour returns have become 
increasingly tenuous. This indicates an even stronger imperative for redistribution now than in the 
past. Nonetheless, the crucial roles that redistributive mechanisms have played in providing some 
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degree of resilience within the often radical development transitions of various ‗rising powers‘ has 
tended to be downplayed if not ignored, including in the 2013 Human Development Report (UNDP 
2013). Redistribution arguably needs to feature more prominently in the 2014 report as a crucial 
emphasis within contemporary development agendas. Otherwise, ignoring redistribution while 
simply striving for productivity increases might well exacerbate certain structural aspects of 
vulnerability that evolve alongside human and economic development, thereby undermining the 
social valuation of the objective (or absolute) gains made in human and economic development.  
Redistributive institutional mechanisms in this sense are understood in a broad political 
economy framework as those mechanisms or interventions that correct initial structural inequalities 
(i.e., those deriving from differences in value added productivity across and/or within sectors), 
related wage inequalities and initial functional income distributions (i.e., primarily between wages 
and profits). Social policy obviously plays a central role within these redistributive mechanisms, 
although here we are referring to a wider remit of public policy, including progressivity in fiscal 
policy, public employment and wage policies, subsidized finance, land reform, and so forth. These 
redistributive mechanisms need not pass through the state; they could also operate through families, 
communities and other non-state channels such as religious institutions or civil society 
organizations. The modern state has arguably proven to be the most effective and progressive at 
instituting such functions at a regional or national scale, however, thereby maximizing the potential 
for macro-level ‗social competencies‘, as per the usage of this term in UNDP (2013). As noted by 
Harriss-White (2002) in her work on the centrality of social institutions in assembling and 
regulating factors of production, the social regulation of labour through non-state informal channels, 
such as through social structures of identity in the case of India, is usually of a more exclusionary and 
discriminatory nature than state forms of regulation. While state regulation might be imperfect, the 
alternative is never non-regulation, but regulation through other, often more regressive social 
structures that are much more limited in their potential to create an institutional basis for socializing 
and sharing wealth across different sectors of society.  
 In the following pages, the arguments introduced here are made in four sections. The first 
section deals with the changing nature of social need in the contemporary global context by laying 
out some stylized facts of population growth and labour transitions towards tertiary sector 
employment across the global South. It considers related debates regarding the massive employment 
generation requirements faced by many of these countries in the coming decades. The second section 
briefly reviews the limitations of standard economics approaches in dealing with issues of labour 
market intermediation and employment regulation as well as a variety of alternative socially and 
institutionally embedded views. Building on this, the third section discusses the valuation of labour 
and how standard notions of productivity become complicated and obscured in more complex 
economies that move away from agriculture and physical production altogether, and where 
The Social Value of Employment and the Redistributive Imperative for Development 
 
 2014 Human Development Report Office  
8 OCCASIONAL PAPER  
 
production becomes increasingly globalized. The example of care work is used to illustrate the 
importance of redistributive mechanisms in socializing the costs of relatively skilled service sector 
employment. The last section returns to the redistributive imperative in contemporary development, 
with some examples taken from China. A concluding section offers some reflections with respect to 
structural vulnerabilities.  
Labour transitions and employment generation 
In discussing the social value of employment, and its relation to human development and structural 
vulnerabilities, it is first important to sketch the changing nature of the social need for employment 
in the contemporary global context by laying out some stylized facts of population growth and labour 
transitions occurring worldwide, and their association and possible causal relations with economic 
and human development. The first obvious consideration is population growth that is relatively 
rapid, from a historical perspective. According to the median variant estimate of the 2012 revision of 
World Population Prospects (United Nations 2013),3 global population reached 7 billion in early 
2012, with about 80 million people added annually. Given that fertility and birth rates have been 
declining worldwide, the yearly addition is also declining, although according to the latest median 
revisions, total world population is projected to be still growing by 10 million people a year by 2100, 
when it will have reached almost 10.9 billion people. More proximately, an estimated 2.5 billion 
people will be added to the world‘s population by 2050. Even according to the low fertility variant, 
whereby total fertility rates around the world fall much faster than expected, which is possible,4 
world population is estimated to peak at 8.34 billion by 2050, or an addition of about 1.3 billion 
people to present numbers.5 The bulk of this global population increase is more or less guaranteed by 
population momentum even if higher fertility regions of the world quickly move to replacement 
levels of fertility—i.e., two children per women on average. Notably, most of this increase will take 
                                                          
3 These data are contested. Some have argued that, in comparison to earlier revisions in the mid-2000s, the 
median variant was set unrealistically high in order to emphasize the urgency of challenges presented by 
sustainable development and climate change (e.g., see Pearce 2011). Nonetheless, the data—particularly the 
lower variants—indicate the broad picture of population change over the next 35 years. 
4 The total fertility rate is the average number of live births that women would have in their childbearing years 
(generally from 15-45 years) at a particular point in time, assuming that the fertility rates at that point would 
continue throughout their reproductive period, and that they are not subject to mortality. The rate is expressed as 
children per woman. Faster fertility decline would lead to an earlier and smaller peak population, whereas slower 
fertility decline would lead to a later and larger peak.  
5 According to the low fertility estimate, world population will peak at 8.34 billion people by 2050 and will fall to 
6.7 billion by 2100. According to the high fertility estimate, world population will still be growing by 127 million a 
year by 2100, reaching 16.4 billion people.  
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place in the global South, with the bulk occurring in the poorest countries, particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa, and South and Central Asia. Today‘s baby boomers in countries such as India, Mali, 
Uganda and Yemen will keep population growing for the next generation or two even if radical 
measures rapidly reduce fertility rates, such as China took in the early 1970s and other East Asian 
countries even earlier.  
The development challenges are monumental, even without an alarmist Malthusian or neo-
Malthusian narrative on the impoverishing consequences of such rapid population growth.6 There 
will be a pressing need for employment creation in poor countries with few resources to finance 
capital deepening for even existing employed people.  An estimated 16 countries currently have rates 
of natural population growth exceeding 3 percent a year, based on 2005-2010 data. Uganda, which 
had an estimated population of 5.2 million people in 1950 and almost 34 million people by 2010, is 
projected, according to the median variant, to reach 104 million by 2050, a population larger than 
every European country by that time except the Russian Federation. The median variant assumes 
that total fertility in Uganda will drop from 6.4 children per woman in 2005-2010 to 3.2 in 2045-
2050, at which point the Ugandan population would still be increasing at 2.2 percent a year, whereas 
that of the Russian Federation would be shrinking by 0.6 percent a year. Similarly, Niger, with the 
highest natural increase rate in the world in 2005-2010, grew from 2.6 million people in 1950 to 15.9 
million in 2010 and is projected to reach 69.4 million by 2050, assuming that total fertility drops 
from 7.6 to 5 children per woman. Afghanistan increased from about 7.5 million people in 1950 to 
28.4 million in 2010, and is projected to reach almost 57 million by 2050. While growing slightly less 
fast, at between 2.5 to 3 percent a year in 2005-2010, the population of Nigeria is projected to 
increase from 160 million in 2010 to 440 million by 2050, Iraq from 31 million to 71 million, Yemen 
from 23 million to 43 million, the State of Palestine from 4 million to almost 9 million, and 
Guatemala from 14 million to 31 million.7 Even if women in these countries were to suddenly 
substantially reduce their fertility now, which is already somewhat assumed in the median variant 
                                                          
6 See Fischer (2011a) for a discussion of contemporary demographic insights on these matters, how the problems of 
resource scarcity in the context of contemporary population growth are primarily about distribution rather than 
supply, and a political economy understanding of vulnerability in the context of population growth that 
distinguishes between processes of human development on one hand, and those of capitalist economic 
development, hierarchy and power on the other. 
7 Demeny (2003) made a contrast between the Russian Federation and Yemen, showing that the two populations 
would be almost equal by 2050 at around 100 million people each, although his comparison was based on data 
from the 2001 revision of population projections by the United Nations. This would have relied on estimates from 
the mid- to late 1990s, when the Russian Federation was at the trough of its fertility collapse; fertility has since 
recovered from 1.25 in 1995-2000 to 1.44 in 2005-2010. Yemen was close to its peak total fertility rate, which 
reached 9.23 in 1980-1985 and remained at 8.93 in 1985-1990, then fell to 8.24 in 1990-1995, 6.87 in 1995-2000, 
5.91 in 2000-2005 and 4.91 in 2005-2010. Such retrospectives testify to the degree of assumption involved in 
population projections.  
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projections, much of these population increases is more or less already guaranteed by population 
momentum. The likely doubling or even tripling of these populations from 2010 to 2050 is 
compelling, particularly considering the land and resource scarcities that many of these countries are 
already facing. Niger, for instance, recently suffered from famine and food shortages.8 The rate of 
increase in the working-age population—and hence demands for employment generation—will be 
even faster given declining fertility. 
The potential for agriculture to productively absorb such increases in the workforce of these 
countries is negligible given the already overstretched land resources in most of them. If anything, 
agriculture needs to shed labour if agricultural (labour) productivity is to increase, as many argue 
needs to happen. Food deficit countries, such as Niger and Yemen, will need to export more in order 
to pay for more food imports from abroad. Insofar as the intensification of land-based primary 
commodity exports, such as coffee, cocoa or cut flowers, takes land away from local food production, 
however, it merely offsets the food deficit problem rather than resolving it. In other words, the 
foreign exchange earned through producing food for European supermarkets, minus the profits that 
European corporations organizing such production remit back to Europe, is largely used to pay for 
the increased food imports that these poor countries require as a result of shifting their land and 
labour towards export production and away from domestic food production. 
The bulk of the increase in employment will most certainly need to occur in the secondary 
sector, comprising manufacturing, mining and construction, or in the tertiary sector, encompassing 
services, broadly speaking. And even then, in the best of scenarios, Yemen and other countries would 
need an outlet of international emigration. After all, during Europe‘s phase of rapid population 
growth, as much as 20 percent of its population increase emigrated to North America and other 
temperate ex-colonies, which had been murderously cleansed for the purpose. Emigration from 
developing countries today accounts for a far lesser share of their population increase than in these 
earlier European cases, yet these countries face a far greater need for emigration due to more rapid 
growth pressures. These have arisen from sharper and faster reductions in mortality since the 1950s, 
attributable to fundamentally good human development, and have occurred even as there are far 
fewer resources to face the employment challenges of population increases.  
Without a substantial outlet for migration, as experienced by Europeans, developing countries 
face a particular employment predicament in the contemporary context. Given the capital intensity 
and low degree of employment creation relative to output that is offered by contemporary 
manufacturing, the bulk of the employment generation mentioned above will probably need to occur 
                                                          
8 See a discussion of this by John Cleland at a talk in The Hague in 2009, summarized in Fischer (2010b, p. 23). Also 
see Burki (2013).  
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in services, largely in urban areas. The burden placed on the tertiary sector to absorb rapidly 
increasing workforces is relatively greater in countries attempting to industrialize now than in the 
past, and this burden is compounded by faster rates of population growth.  
Notably, labour transitions out of agriculture have also been occurring largely irrespective of 
economic conditions in urban areas. This demographic insight serves as a useful antidote to many of 
the uncritical assumptions that are often made about the reasons for urbanization. The proposition, 
classically formulated by Kingsley Davis (1963) as multi-phasic responses to population growth, is 
that migration and associated movements of labour out of agriculture are primarily driven by 
increasing family sizes as more children survive to adulthood, and more adults live longer. Economic 
‗push‘ and ‗pull‘ incentives might well serve as more proximate facilitating factors, influencing the 
timing or destinations of migration, but not as remote causal factors of migration. Social structural 
factors, such as inheritance practices or gender norms, can play equally if not more important 
facilitating roles. Increasing household population size—as with aggregate population size—is not 
contradictory with falling fertility, but is the result of population momentum. In other words, 
replacement level fertility only replaces a population once parents and grandparents start to die. It 
might take several generations of below replacement fertility rates before a population starts to 
stabilize and decline, particularly in a context of increasing life expectancy. This is demonstrated by 
the Republic of Korea, which had one of the lowest total fertility rates in the world in 2005-2010, at 
1.23 children per woman, and yet was still growing at a positive rate of almost 0.5 percent a year 
(United Nations 2013). Davis‘ contention was that families respond to such population pressure in a 
variety of ways and, contrary to Malthusian worries, the poor and those with more constrained 
resources tend to respond more quickly than those with fewer constraints. Migration is one of the 
most immediate responses. These social processes obviously also need to be considered alongside 
questions of inequality, agrarian labour regimes, and the availability of off-farm employment in both 
rural and urban areas.9  
Strain on poorer rural households is not resolved by commercializing agriculture, including, for 
instance, land leasing by transnational corporations in Africa. Nor is it resolved by increasing the 
capital intensity of agriculture, for example, by using tractors instead of people. These types of 
intensification generally increase labour productivity, but at the cost of employing fewer people. 
They do not necessarily make the land more productive, albeit this is still debated in agrarian studies 
                                                          
9 In the famous Machakos case in Kenya, successful societal adaptation to environmental stress was achieved in 
part through increased inequality due to intensification of labour in land use and greater social differentiation, as 
well as an ample supply of off-farm employment opportunities due to the proximity of Machakos to Nairobi. See 
the seminal studies on this by Tiffen and Mortimer (1992); Tiffen, Mortimore and Gichuki (1994); and Tiffen (1995). 
Also see Boyd and Slaymaker (2000).  
The Social Value of Employment and the Redistributive Imperative for Development 
 
 2014 Human Development Report Office  
12 OCCASIONAL PAPER  
 
regarding the ‗inverse relationship‘ between land size and (land) productivity. 10  Agricultural 
intensification tends to lead to land concentration and/or intensify the displacement of labour from 
agriculture, thereby exacerbating strains on existing land use, particularly for smallholders. At the 
same time, it may reduce the availability of employment on larger farms, which is usually the lifeline 
of landless and poor farmers who cannot meet their subsistence needs on their own land. Even the 
application of technology to increase food supply, where this does not lead to the exploitation or 
dispossession of small farmers, at best can only marginally compensate for the increases in 
household or family size.  
Many contemporary demographers have argued that demographic transitions essentially drive 
processes of urbanization, regardless of economic ‗pull‘ incentives deriving from urban areas, in 
contrast to the more conventional belief that urbanization is primarily driven by economic growth 
and industrialization.11 This insight helps to understand cases where employment transitions and 
urbanization have been occurring in recent decades in contexts of little or no economic growth, such 
as in Latin America in the 1980s or much of sub-Saharan Africa throughout the 1980s and 1990s.12 
Urbanization has generally occurred irrespective of employment conditions in urban areas. Where 
conditions are dire, rural-to-urban migration often leads to the transformation of rural poverty into 
urban poverty, particularly in poorly remunerated urban informal employment. Such outcomes can 
ironically appear as improving incomes due to the higher living costs of urban areas, although this 
cost differential might nonetheless provide possibilities for raising rural incomes through 
remittances. These outcomes can also appear to contribute to poverty reduction if poverty lines are 
poorly calibrated to the higher costs of living in urban areas, which is common.13 In this sense, 
urbanization involves processes of reconstituting social needs, including far greater monetization 
and commodification of livelihoods than in rural areas, such that notions of subsistence and poverty 
are never entirely translatable or comparable in the transition from rural to urban settings.  
                                                          
10 For recent examples, see Griffen et al. (2002, 2004) and Eastwood et al. (2010). For criticisms of the former 
from the left, see the special issue of the Journal of Agrarian Change 4(1-2), introduced by Byres (2004).  
11 See Dyson (2011) for an excellent discussion of this demographic understanding of urbanization.  
12 For an interesting extension of Dyson‘s argument in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, see Fox (2012).  
13  Satterthwaite (2004) makes a powerful and compelling argument that the scale of urban poverty is 
systematically underestimated in the official statistics produced and used by governments and international 
agencies, in large part because of the underestimation of non-food essential needs in urban areas. Also see Hussain 
(2003) for an example of the substantial underestimation of urban poverty rates in coastal China due to the use of 
national poverty lines that do not account for variations in costs of living across different cities and regions. Based 
on provincial poverty lines, urban poverty rates in south-west China were in fact lower than the national average 
in 1998, very close to those of the south-east, and considerably lower than those of the north and north-east. The 
results were strikingly contrary to the conventional perspective based on a single national line, which invariably 
shows much lower poverty rates in more costly urban areas (ibid., p. 18). 
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According to this demographic understanding, faster demographic transitions intensify 
urbanization. Even in a context where poor rural families rapidly reduce their fertility, as has 
generally been the case in most developing countries, compared to the slower speed in European 
experiences, faster rates of population increase due to faster initial mortality declines nonetheless 
place relatively greater strain on families going through these transitions than was historically the 
case during Europe‘s phase of rapid population growth. This understanding is important in order to 
make a subtle distinction between processes of human development on one hand and of capitalist 
economic development on the other.  
A demographic understanding of urbanization and related employment transitions serves as a 
particularly useful antidote to the view that, because urbanization is driven by economic incentives, 
its occurrence must therefore infer that employment opportunities exist, and that the role of 
governments is to merely facilitate their maximization through policies promoting labour market 
flexibility, secure property rights, and so forth. This view might be described as belonging more 
generally to ‗supply-side‘ economics approaches to employment generation, referring to the orthodox 
view that supply creates its own demand (also known as Say‘s Law or what Keynes referred to as the 
tail wagging the dog). An alternative perspective is that employment transitions and urbanization are 
primarily driven by social need rather than economic incentives, and that optimal quantities and 
qualities of employment are not guaranteed by the free and flexible operation of labour markets. 
They require governments to actively engage with development and related public policies to 
mediate the changing supply of labour generated by rapid social structural transformations. If not, 
governments risk exacerbating employment disjunctures in both rural and urban areas, which labour 
market flexibility might in fact offer little potential to address. As usual, the experience of East Asia 
serves as one of the central bones of contention in the representational disputes on these issues.  
The supply-side view implicitly informs much of the fairly optimistic literature on the 
‗demographic dividend‘. The demographic dividend refers to the one-off opportunity that occurs 
during demographic transitions once fertility starts to fall, a population starts to age, and then the 
overall dependency ratio falls to an all-time, one-time historical low for several decades, before 
increasing elderly dependencies start to compensate for reductions in youthful dependencies. This 
phase is called a ‗dividend‘ or ‗bonus‘ because the largest share of population ever is in the working 
age groups and is in principle available to work, consume, save and/or invest. This proportionately 
reduces the amount of effort that families, communities and governments need to spend and invest 
in caring for dependents, young and old, rather than in productive activities. It is a non-
controversial, established, stylized fact of changing age structures from a predominantly young 
population in the pre-transitional and early phases of demographic transition to a predominantly 
older population in the later stages.  
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The argument in much of the literature is that a large part of the so-called ‗economic miracles‘ of 
East Asia can be attributed to this dividend, in other words, to the realization of the benefits of rapid 
fertility decline that took place in countries such as the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China 
and even China.14 The controversial element in many of these arguments is not the recognition of the 
‗dividend‘, but the implicit supply-side understanding of causality, as if the supply of labour via the 
demographic transition drove productive employment generation—and hence the miracle. In reality, 
the dividend is a potential, in the sense that realizing its benefits ultimately depends on the ability of 
economies to actually employ the extra workforce. If additional workers are not employed, the 
dividend is meaningless. The logic of the dividend argument appears to assume full employment, or 
else it would equally apply to cases of high unemployment or underemployment, because the same 
benefits could be accrued by simply employing an unemployed person or by more productively 
employing an underemployed person. Unemployment is rarely referred to as a ‗dividend‘ or a 
‗bonus‘, however. Explaining part of the economic miracle with demography risks the danger of 
potentially misattributing important interactions between two types of structural change 
(demographic and economic) as a causality running from the former to the latter. This causality is 
questionable because the so-called benefits of fertility reduction can only be capitalized on in the 
presence of an economic miracle and the policies bringing it about. Recognizing the potential of the 
demographic dividend does not resolve the employment question, but only serves to highlight the 
increased imperative of employment generation in the context of demographic transitions. In no way 
does it diminish the achievements in generating employment in the successful East Asian cases of 
late industrialization.  
The fact that the dividend is a potential is well recognized in the literature, although the precise 
implications are not, particularly with regard to the plausible characterization of the East Asian 
miracles as following economic models of employment maximization versus efficiency 
maximization.15 To be fair, the seminal authors of the demographic dividend literature argue that so-
called ‗good policies‘ are required to capitalize on the dividend. The characterization of such good 
policies aligns more or less along the lines of the Washington and post-Washington consensuses, 
however, including labour market flexibility in particular, rather than emphasizing the importance 
traditionally accorded to formal employment in East Asian development strategies, at least until the 
1997-1998 East Asian crisis, to the extent of causing labour market rigidities.16 The possibility that 
                                                          
14 For the seminal work on this, see Higgins and Williamson (1997); Bloom and Williamson (1998); and Bloom, 
Canning and Sevilla (2003).  
15 Krugman (1994) refers to this point, ironically as a criticism of the ‗East Asian miracle‘ and with the intention to 
diminish perception of their achievements.  
16 Amsden (2010) forcefully makes this point with respect to the disregard of formal employment in current 
development agendas.  
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certain degrees of labour market inflexibility might well have enhanced development and 
employment, even if they reduced efficiency from a firm perspective, is usually ignored. The 
recognition of a structural demographic ‗dividend‘ in terms of reduced dependency burdens does not 
resolve these politicized policy questions and debates about what is required to generate growth and 
to employ a rapidly growing population, nor does it suggest any deterministic outcome in this regard.  
There is some excellent work on macroeconomic policies for promoting full employment in a 
development context, particularly under the auspices of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO).17 In line with the analysis here, however, a degree of caution is required when applying the 
idea of full employment to developing countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia that are still very agrarian. Full employment as an achievable policy goal evolved with reference 
to the fully industrialized context of Europe and North America in the 20th century; its application to 
a development context in which a substantial portion of the labour force is embedded within rural 
livelihoods can be problematic, particularly considering that such people are generally employed in a 
wide variety of ways, such as on family farms or in informal employment, and not necessarily in a 
manner associated with conventional forms of formal urban employment. This is a basic insight 
coming out of the rural livelihoods literature. Moreover, the truly poor, in contexts with little or no 
social security, are not usually unemployed, but must accept whatever work is available at whatever 
wage. In this sense, the more essential concern with development is not necessarily full employment 
as such, but labour force transitions to higher productivity, higher value added, and/or higher quality 
and better remunerated forms of employment. These occur most fundamentally through transitions 
out of agriculture and into other sectors of the economy, whether in rural or urban areas. From this 
broader perspective, concerns of employment maximization and security need to involve a wider 
spectrum of policy approaches, including land reform, for instance, as a way of increasing security in 
the sources of labour transition, as well as a broad range of approaches to address insecurity of 
labour transitioning out of agriculture. This is in addition to the more conventional policies of social 
security and labour market intervention at the receiving end of transitions, in more formalized and 
urbanized categories of employment. 
Keeping this qualification in mind, some lessons of employment security and maximization 
within such transitions can be drawn from successful cases in East Asia. First, the pace of transition 
is worth highlighting. For instance, the share of labour employed in the primary sector (mostly 
agriculture) in the Republic of Korea fell from around 30 percent in 1980 to around 9 percent in 
2006; in Malaysia, the primary sector labour share fell from 55 percent in the 1960s to 16 percent in 
2000. Transitions have been slower in Brazil, where the primary sector labour share fell from about 
                                                          
17 For instance, see Roy and Weeks (2005), Cornia (2006), Frenkel (2006), Akyüz (2006), Ocampo and Jomo (2008), 
Felipe (2010), Damill et al. (2011), or Weerakoon and Arunatilake (2011). 
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29 to 20 percent between 1980 and 2006, and much slower in India, where the primary sector share 
barely fell between 1960 and 2005, from just above to just below 70 percent (UNRISD 2010, chapter 
one). In China, the proportion of total employment in the primary sector fell from almost 84 percent 
in 1952, to 81 percent in 1970, 69 percent in 1980, 60 percent in 1990, 50 percent in 2000, and then 
to under 37 percent by 2010, i.e., more than 10 percentage points a decade since 1970 (China 
National Bureau of Statistics 2011, table 4-3). In this respect, the lack of transition out of agriculture 
in India is probably a more pressing issue for employment policy than the objective of creating full 
employment, especially if the ‗fullness‘ of employment is achieved by people remaining in 
agriculture. 
Within a context of significant transition out of agriculture in combination with substantial 
population growth, ‗success‘ might be deemed as avoiding a situation in which the bulk of 
transitioning labour ends up in insecure informal employment, as has occurred in much of Latin 
America, where labour forces are both highly urbanized and informalized.18 The policy measures to 
achieve such success in East Asia have been varied, but they have generally not fallen into the mould 
of labour market flexibilization and other such orthodox approaches to employment policy. They are 
better characterized as prioritizing the maximization of employment at the receiving end of labour 
transitions coupled with various measures to enhance livelihood or employment security throughout 
these transitions so as to avoid excessive social dislocation and unrest, among other concerns. They 
include, as mentioned above, land reform in the cases of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province 
of China.19  
As discussed in the fourth section of this paper, the current tenancy system in rural China serves 
much the same purpose of providing an egalitarian, even if somewhat poor (albeit still very popular), 
floor of security for rural dwellers from which they can then strategize their migration. State-led 
industrial policy has also obviously been important in these cases as a means to create the conditions 
for labour to be able to transition to more productive, higher value added and relatively formalized 
employment outside agriculture. Monetary policies aimed at sustaining aggregate demand for 
employment maximization have included tolerance for moderate degrees of inflation. 20  State 
ownership of the banking sector in China and the Republic of Korea has allowed for the financing of 
not only industrial policy, but also of employment-generating activities such as infrastructure 
construction, both of which are not necessarily profitable in the short term. Fiscal policies have 
                                                          
18 In this respect, recent characterizations of Brazil as having full employment, on the basis of labour force 
surveys, needs to be questioned. Much recent employment generation has been in relatively insecure and informal 
service sector employment.  
19 See Kay (2002) for an excellent discussion of this.  
20 For instance, see an interesting discussion of this in Stiglitz et al. (2006).  
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similarly been directed towards employment creation; the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme in India is one often cited example of this. Another could be taken from the massive regional 
development strategies in China since the mid-1990s, in which economic renewal, increases in urban 
formal employment, and rising wages have been financed by rising provincial government fiscal 
deficits, as discussed in the fourth section.  
Other more targeted and refined labour market interventions have also been used to create 
employment security. For instance, Singapore has provided wage subsidies to employers from the 
1980s to the present via temporary reductions to mandated employer social security contributions as 
a means to minimize job loss in periods of economic downturn (Hoon 2011). Trade and exchange 
rate policies have been more contextual and debatable. Despite the conventional wisdom now, based 
on the experience of China since the late 1990s, that trade surpluses and hence undervalued 
currencies are the best way to boost aggregate demand and maximize employment, even if not 
necessarily appreciated by trade competitors or sustainable on a generalized global level, earlier 
experiences in the Republic of Korea were actually characterized by trade deficits up to the 1980s, as 
was the experience of China up to the early 1990s (e.g., see Fischer 2009b, 2010d). In general, 
various heterodox approaches to employment policy and economic policy more generally lead us to 
question the conventional wisdom regarding employment, particularly with respect to the contexts of 
labour transition in developing countries.  
Labour market intermediation: towards a socially and 
institutionally embedded view 
With regard to politicized policy questions regarding employment generation in a context of rapid 
development transitions—both human and economic—it is important to understand how 
mainstream emphasis in these policy matters is deeply embedded within an orthodox neoclassical 
economics reasoning. This requires reviewing the limitations of this reasoning and its derivatives in 
dealing with issues of employment, and reflecting on a variety of alternative socially and 
institutionally embedded views in order to come closer to an understanding of how the social value 
of employment might be related to economic and human development.  
A neoclassical reasoning need not necessarily lead to what might be called a ‗neoliberal‘ policy 
stance. Many economists have used neoclassical deductive reasoning to justify state intervention, 
industrial policy, trade protection or universal public provisioning, such as Amartya Sen and Joseph 
Stiglitz, to name two well-known examples. Neoclassical reasoning sets up a frame of analysis such 
that state intervention and/or regulation need to be justified, however, rather than being understood 
as an embedded feature of modern economies. There is thus an in-built tendency for the case of state 
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regulation to be on the defensive, in tension with and morally trumped by freedom, rather than being 
presented as enabling freedom via the strengthening of social competencies within complex modern 
market societies. The liberal bias of neoclassical economics no doubt provides important insights 
from certain perspectives, such as with respect to the principles of market intermediation among 
atomized and relatively free individuals, although it is limited in terms of providing a holistic 
understanding of social systems, including their structural and institutional aspects, and how these 
change throughout the course of development.  
In essence, a line of reasoning can be identified as neoclassical on the basis of the deductive 
principle that a perfect market—if this could ever exist in reality—leads to the most efficient and 
pareto-optimal outcome possible. Over time, it also leads to greater equality, as per factor price 
equalization theory. Hence, the ultimate or abstract solution for both efficiency and equality is found 
in free and perfect markets, at least in principle, even if not possible in practice. Pure neoclassical 
theory, entailing perfect information, perfect competition, all other things being held constant, 
inexistent or insignificant transaction costs, etc., predicts market clearance at a given price where 
supply meets demand. The quantity demanded at this price is sold and the quantity supplied is 
purchased. Transferring this market analogy to employment implies that a perfectly competitive 
labour market will generate no unemployment so long as wages are flexible and the supply and 
demand of labour is free to adjust to wages. According to the utility theory of ‗revealed preferences‘, 
this equilibrium wage rate would also reflect the social opportunity costs of labour, and is thus an 
effective measure of its social value. The criticism of utilitarianism by Amartya Sen, which informs 
his capability approach, refers to such forms of utility theory. 
Obviously, most neoclassical economists will qualify that these pure market situations do not 
exist in reality, and that abstract general equilibrium modelling is not meant to represent reality in 
any literal way. Nonetheless, a neoclassical theoretical position uses this ideal market solution as an 
abstract and deductive reference point to which second and further-order solutions are compared.21 
Moreover, the hypothetical ‗market‘ in which transactions are made is usually not specified or 
described; presumably, the sum of transactions itself is the market, regardless of whether these take 
place in a single location or in a dispersed and disorganized manner. This inconvenience is usually 
deflected either by reference to Smith‘s invisible hand or else Walrus‘ auctioneer. The implication is 
that the simplicity of the abstract market reference point is sufficiently pertinent to effectively mimic 
the operation of modern complex market systems. 
                                                          
21 For instance, see Lal (2002, pp. 49–51) for a clear statement on the use of the deductive ideal reference point in 
neoclassical economics, or what he refers to as received wisdom. 
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The slippery slope of the neoclassical paradigm is based on the degree to which market 
imperfections are recognized in reality; are considered to be tractable; and are deemed to produce 
second, third or worse-order outcomes. It is also premised on judging these outcomes as superior or 
inferior to the option of state intervention in the market. The case for state intervention is argued by 
way of the degree of diversion from an abstract perfect market possibility. Modifications of 
neoclassical theory, such as modern welfare theory (confusingly to be distinguished from the 
economics of the welfare state),22  recognize market imperfections such as externalities, lack of 
perfect information, lack of perfect futures markets, transaction costs and so on, but still generally 
hold that a second-best free but imperfect market outcome is better than state intervention in most 
settings. Besides in certain exceptional situations, proponents of this position argue that most 
movements towards approximating an ideal market situation would improve the second-best 
imperfect outcomes, thereby leading to less unemployment or less disequilibria between savings and 
investment. This view is based on the assertion that decentralized market coordination in most cases 
results in superior unintended outcomes—more so than if the state or other entity intentionally 
attempts to predict or impose market outcomes, even under conditions where the knowledge at the 
disposal of the state might be greatly superior to any single (in this case, atomized) actor operating in 
the market. The neoliberal policy position, which is closely informed by modern welfare theory, 
adopts the view that close-to-perfect markets—i.e., markets in which outcomes are better than state 
intervention in most cases—are attainable as economic and social realities.  
According to this logic, the best way to achieve both economic efficiency and greater equality is 
to prevent obstructions to free markets and strive for market perfection as much as possible—
particularly through strengthening market-supporting institutions such as private property rights 
and contract law. State action should be restricted to these objectives and to the provisioning of state 
welfare to those falling through the transitional cracks of imperfect markets on the way to market 
perfection. Latitude is often allowed for state involvement in some aspects of public provisioning, 
particularly in basic services, where externalities are too great for markets to internalize, so long as 
this involvement is conducted in market-harmonizing ways, and does not crowd out the possibility 
for the private sector to supersede this role if and when it can. This rational informs arguments that 
the reduction of market distortions is an important policy for reducing inequality, and that public 
social spending should only be used for those who qualify as deservingly needy, since others can 
presumably purchase social goods for themselves through private providers. It also informs the 
advocacy of the World Bank, for instance in its 2013 World Development Report on jobs (2012), of 
                                                          
22 For a good presentation of welfare economics, see Lal (2002 pp. 52–55). In contrast to this theoretical treatment 
of ‗welfare‘ (read ‗utility‘), see Barr (1998) for a thorough analysis of the more applied economics of the welfare 
state. 
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trade liberalization, labour market deregulation, and policies to correct market imperfections as 
pillars to support ‗good job‘ creation, and address poverty and inequality. 
There is not much new in the essence of this policy advice. The underlying logic has been at the 
core of the dominant policy paradigm over the last 30 years, which in turn has been associated with 
what many refer to as ‗jobless growth‘ in some countries, or else with facilitating the stagnation of 
average real wages since the 1970s in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States. 
In their defence, proponents of this paradigm would retort that it has been the continued obstruction 
of markets by government policies or other collective actors such as trade unions that has prevented 
the outcomes predicted by theory.23 To paraphrase Karl Polanyi‘s criticism of the laissez-faire utopia 
of economic liberalism: Because the ideal free market is never attainable as a reality in a complex 
modern economy, it can always be argued that the failures of economic liberalism are not that 
markets were liberalized, but that they were not liberalized enough.  
MARKET IMPERFECTIONS: NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THE 
IMPERFECT INFORMATION APPROACH 
More critical theoretical views have emerged from within the neoclassical paradigm itself through a 
stronger recognition of market imperfections. The dominant approach is known as New Institutional 
Economics, which is often presented by its proponents, such as Douglas North (1990), as a critique 
of neoclassical economics, even though it is fundamentally still embedded within this paradigm. It 
can be seen as a further and somewhat more applied elaboration of modern ‗welfare‘ economics, 
insofar as it explores in further detail the subject of transactions costs as one particular factor 
obstructing perfect market outcomes. The main insight emerging from this perspective is the role of 
‗institutions‘ in reducing these transaction costs. The implicit assumption is that this reduction will 
bring us closer to a perfect, ideal market outcome. This leads to a bias in terms of which types of 
institutions are to be promoted and which are not. Institutions seen to provide for the smooth 
functioning of markets and that bring down transaction costs are encouraged, such as stable 
property rights and practices that harmonize, strengthen and enforce contractual obligations. 
Conversely, institutions seen as obstructing price or quantity adjustments, such as government 
interventions, unionization and collective bargaining, are generally ignored or even chastised.  
A consensus has emerged in mainstream economic theory and analysis on this understanding of 
institutions, or institutionalism. The consensus is typically focused on secure (private) property 
rights as representative of the ideal institutional form for reducing transaction costs, and thereby 
                                                          
23 For instance, see The Economist (2012) for a good example of blaming trade unions. See Fischer (2012) for 
further analysis of these positions. 
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allowing functional competitive markets and incentive structures that promote investment and 
accumulation. This focus has resulted in a profuse literature applying increasingly elaborate 
econometric techniques to cross-country regressions in attempts to explain modern economic 
growth on the basis of property rights, such as the well-known paper by Acemoglu et al. (2001), 
which was arguably much more significant for its methodological innovations than for its empirical 
or theoretical insights, which are questionable on many grounds. In a survey article, ―Halving World 
Poverty,‖ Besley and Burgess (2003) suggest that the overarching theme in recent development 
economics literature has been ―the centrality of the institutional context in which policy and 
accumulation decisions are made‖ (p. 19). By ‗policy‘, they refer to trade liberalization and other 
aspects associated with the so-called Washington Consensus, whereas by ‗institutional setting‘ they 
refer to the extent to which property rights and contracts are secure and enforced. Citing Acemoglu 
et al. (2001), and Hall and Jones (1999), Besley and Burgess (2003, p. 16) argue that secure (private) 
property rights are an important vehicle for the poor given that they can promote both equity and 
efficiency, while improvements in the enforceability of contracts can promote investment and the 
development of firms. This perspective has gained such inertia that even more critical authors such 
as Rodrik et al. (2004) accept these principles of secure property rights, albeit they qualify that 
credible signals that property rights will be respected are ―apparently more important than enacting 
them into law as a formal private property rights regime‖ (p. 157). Such attempts to adapt 
understanding of reality to theory has no doubt been driven by the fact that China developed for 
much of the last 30 years without any clear system of secure private property rights.24  
Despite claims that the New Institutional Economics approach is a critique of neoclassical 
economic theory, the underlying theoretical principles can be characterized as neoclassical insofar as 
the associated authors do not depart from the theoretical welfare principle that, under hypothetically 
perfect conditions, markets would produce both efficient and equitable outcomes (equity according 
to factor price equalization theory and its derivations). Correspondingly, most of the focus on 
institutions is oriented towards understanding how market imperfections (i.e., transaction costs or 
imperfect information, whether transitory or intrinsic) obstruct this first-best outcome, and 
                                                          
24 Huang (2012) argues, however, that the bulk of township and village enterprises in China from their inception 
were essentially private. Rural private entrepreneurship and financial reforms in the 1980s thus ―correlate strongly 
with some of China‘s best-known achievements—poverty reduction, fast GDP growth driven by personal 
consumption (rather than by corporate investments and government spending), and an initial decline of income 
inequality‖ (p. 148). He also argues that such liberalizations were reversed in the 1990s, although this does not 
help to explain the booming growth since then. Even though township and village enterprises might be best 
understood as cases of private entrepreneurship, property rights in the de-collectivizing economy could hardly be 
considered secure in the sense understood by the New Institutional Economics literature. As noted later with 
reference to Schumpeter, it might actually be the case that the context of vaguely defined and insecure property 
rights during this early reform period was precisely optimal for such private entrepreneurship, rather than secure 
property rights.  
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conversely, how ‗institutions‘, understood as private property rights and other factors that reduce the 
transaction costs of operating in markets, can act to compensate for imperfections and thereby bring 
a market outcome closer to its optimum, with the assumption that it is this optimal efficiency that is 
the primary cause of investment and economic accumulation.  
While the ‗imperfect information approach‘ or ‗information economics paradigm‘ pioneered by 
Joseph Stiglitz and colleagues presents a more radical critique, it also remains within this 
neoclassical paradigm, insofar as it accepts the perfect market outcome as its deductive abstract 
reference point, against which government intervention is to be justified.25 In other words, while the 
ideal perfect market is accepted as an abstract principle, in reality most markets are characterized by 
intrinsic information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, which ultimately result in 
obstructions to pure market equilibrium in many ways similar to, although more intractable than, 
the obstructions caused by transaction costs (some might see asymmetric information itself as a form 
of transaction cost). Stiglitz typically presents this point of view with the example of labour markets, 
ironically posed in terms of the employer not knowing the productivity of an employee to be hired.26  
While taking positions similar to those of New Institutional Economics and modern welfare 
economics in their focus on the obstructions that prevent pure market outcomes, imperfect 
information theorists nonetheless see informational asymmetries as more intractable than is 
accepted by the previous views. In other words, there is a tendency in New Institutional Economics 
theories to see transaction costs as temporary or surmountable market imperfections that can be 
overcome with the development of more sophisticated institutions that promote market efficiency—
advocacy of ‗good governance‘ for developing countries under the post-Washington Consensus is an 
example. In contrast, proponents of the imperfect information paradigm tend to see market 
imperfections as more or less inherent to complex economic systems, and thus likely to intensify 
with the evolution of more sophisticated, complex and opaque market systems. Under this 
perspective, regulation and market operation become co-dependent as economies become more 
complex. Ignoring this opens the way for rent-seeking, theft, abuse and all sorts of other perverse 
consequences within both public and private sectors (whereas welfare economics or New 
Institutional Economics approaches exclusively emphasize these dangers within the public sector, for 
example by theorizing public sector rent-seeking as a market obstruction). More established forms of 
                                                          
25 For some of the foundational contributions to this approach, see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980), and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); see Stiglitz (1986) for a good discussion of its application to 
development economics.  
26 The inverse, whereby an employee entering a wage bargain simply does not have the information that an 
employer has at their disposal about others competing for the same position, would be a more pertinent 
representation of the power relations operating in a labour market and would also make the case for collective 
bargaining. 
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government regulation of market systems to prevent the abuses that invariably arise are thereby 
justified, even within advanced capitalist economies that are supposedly the models informing ‗good 
governance‘ and the post-Washington Consensus. Stiglitz‘s criticisms of shock liberalization in the 
Russian Federation, for instance, or of unregulated globalization more generally, are good 
representations of this position (e.g., see Stiglitz 2002). Nonetheless, underpinning his analysis and 
making his theory essentially neoclassical is the assumption that if, in an ideal world, these 
informational asymmetries could be overcome, we would find ourselves moving towards a perfect 
market outcome. Information imperfections become the reason for less than optimal market 
outcomes, as opposed to, say, Schumpeterian ideas, later carried on by Alfred Hirschman, that 
informational asymmetries or market disequilibria might in fact serve as the basis for dynamism 
within capitalism, driving profit opportunities, innovation and investment. 
BEYOND NEOCLASSICISM: CROSSING THE ABSTRACT DEDUCTIVE THRESHOLD 
There has been much reaction to the neoclassical form of institutionalism from a variety of heterodox 
perspectives, particularly Marxist ones. Ben Fine (2001) directs his criticism at the so-called 
‗methodological individualism‘ of these neoclassical approaches, and particularly targets Joseph 
Stiglitz in his critique of the post-Washington Consensus. Mushtaq Khan (e.g., see 2002 and 2006) 
has made important contributions in pointing out how violations of property rights are often at the 
root of capitalist transitions, drawing from Marxist notions of primitive accumulation and applying 
these to the early phases of late industrialization in East Asia, where property rights were effectively 
restructured, such as through land reform, or else created anew through monopolies in efforts to 
direct incentives towards the development of new productive capacities. Khan generally avoids the 
more fundamental question of whether or not, once this process is instituted and a fully evolved 
capitalist destination is reached, markets and their institutional foundations do indeed conform to 
neoclassical expectations.  
A similar Marxist critique of market liberalism is that compulsion due to labour 
commodification undermines the free operation of markets because people are not free to not engage 
with labour markets. Compulsion in this sense undermines the ideal free market logic because 
markets are not free if one cannot withdraw from them. This lack of freedom to be excluded, rather 
than included, is usually a condition of exploitation. In other words, the free market logic is only 
relevant under conditions of freedom as a minimal but not necessarily sufficient condition. Many 
precursors or pioneers of early neoclassical theory in the 19th century, such as Leon Walras, were 
‗scientific‘ socialists who accepted that free market efficiency was a principle that would apply in a 
context of equality and freedom from compulsion. The very operation of a market relies on the ability 
of the seller and buyer to not sell or buy in order for the bargaining to function as postulated by 
theory. If labour is not free to not work, then we must fundamentally question the extension of this 
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market logic to the labour market. Lack of freedom need not only apply to the classical world of 
people barely subsisting at survival wages; compulsions that discipline labour can operate in more 
affluent conditions, including the need to pay rent, transport, health care bills, school fees, student 
loans, credit card debt, mortgage payments, or any other necessity for a minimal degree of 
functionality in society let alone dignity.27 Such social needs are not merely socially constructed or 
conditioned relative norms, such as in the United States, where people might feel deprived if they do 
not own a car. They can also be very real and hard constraints that can drive people into objective 
states of deprivation if not met, such as not being able to access necessary health care.  
Despite the evident power of this ‗compulsion‘ critique, compulsion can nonetheless be 
construed as a type of market imperfection, in the sense that compulsions can be entered into the 
range of factors that obstruct free market operations, alongside transaction costs and imperfect 
information. This skirts the issue of whether or not labour markets would function in the manner 
predicted by neoclassical theory in the absence of compulsion.  
Chang (2003) takes a step further towards a socially embedded view of markets by arguing that 
even ‗free markets‘ are political constructs of rights-obligations structures, and are regulated in the 
sense that state involvement sets the playing field, who plays and the terms of play. He contends that 
―no market in the end is ‗free‘, as all markets have some state regulations on who can participate in 
which markets and on what terms…. It is only because some state regulations—and the rights and the 
obligations that they support, or even create—can be so totally accepted that some markets appear to 
have no ‗intervention‘ at all and are therefore considered ‗free‘‖ (p.49). Similar to Khan, Chang does 
not fully enter the black box of markets as institutions themselves, but focuses instead on how 
markets are instituted by other, wider factors. In this subtle respect, many New Institutional 
Economics authors such as North (1990) or Acemoglu et al. (2001) would probably not disagree too 
much with Chang, insofar as they all understand that markets are instituted. Hence, Chang‘s insight 
does not take us to the heart of the problem. The more essential question is, once instituted, how do 
markets function? Once the terms are set, does the free interaction of markets tend towards an 
equilibrium, even if this equilibrium is unfair, and, if so, how?  
A more fundamental departure from the broader neoclassical paradigm arguably starts with a 
rejection of the dichotomy between state and market as a meaningful basis from which to understand 
the modern economy, including modern market operations, and especially at the macroeconomic or 
aggregate level. For instance, a Keynesian view, from a post-Keynesian reading, starts from the 
                                                          
27 See Heintz (2008, p. 13) for an excellent discussion of this last point. He cites empirical studies documenting an 
increase in labour force participation—particularly among women—when average real earnings fall. This suggests 
that labour supply and earnings may be negatively correlated, particularly among low-income households, given 
that households increase their labour supply when faced with lower earnings in order to make ends meet. 
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understanding that even perfect markets can fail. In particular, aggregate pseudo-markets dealing 
with employment or savings and investment fail regularly because the institutional mechanisms 
driving supply and demand in these aggregates are simply not coordinated in the manner supposed 
of markets. It cannot be assumed that even perfect markets will move towards equilibrium without 
the intervening presence of some form of regulatory non-market coordination, not simply as a 
regulator of markets or market entry, but as an inherent functional element embedded within market 
systems, especially in aggregate pseudo-markets.  
Of course, this reading of Keynes depends on how, or which, of his writings are read. The neo-
Keynesian neoclassical synthesis drew from his theoretical examples of how wage rigidities (or sticky 
wages) could lead to market failure. Drawing from one of Keynes‘s stylized facts that money wages 
cannot be reduced in a free society, it has been commonly contended that Keynes‘ argument was a 
special case that applied under conditions of wage rigidities, thereby apparently supporting a market 
imperfection understanding of unemployment. As pointed out by Skidelski (2003, pp. 535–537), 
Keynes used these theoretical examples as heuristic devices. He also clearly stipulated his case under 
the theoretical condition that wages are fully flexible, and argued that his analysis was not dependent 
on wage rigidities.28 Even under conditions of flexible wages, wage adjustment, or falling wage rates 
in order to increase the demand for labour, would be self-defeating, because falling wage rates would 
lower aggregate demand and result in less demand for labour, and therefore eliminate any potential 
benefit of flexible wages in achieving full employment.29  
Rather than sticky versus flexible wages, the key distinction of Keynes from neoclassicism (or 
what he called ‗the classics‘) arguably resides in his implicit or even explicit form of institutionalism. 
Employment and savings and investment play a central role in this respect. For instance, a labour 
‗market‘, as an aggregate concept, cannot be considered a market in a strict micro sense. Similar to 
savings and investment, which regulate aggregate demand, labour markets are better conceived as 
pseudo-markets; they function in the aggregate through a variety of complex mechanisms, some but 
not all of which operate through the decentralized but coordinated decision-making characteristic of 
market transactions. Supply and demand in the aggregate might be responsive to each other at the 
margin under certain conditions, hence the origins of neoclassical theory as ‗marginal theory‘, and 
thus they could be related to markets by way of analogy. But movements towards equilibrium are not 
guaranteed, even under conditions where agents interact freely and knowledgably through price 
incentives. Suppliers and demanders in these aggregate settings are usually responding to different 
                                                          
28 This point has been reiterated more recently in Farmer (2013). 
29 Again, as noted by Heintz (2008, p. 13), falling wages might also increase labour supply from poorer households 
in order to make ends meet. This would further exacerbate the disequilibrium given that, according to neoclassical 
theory, labour supply should fall with falling wages.  
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sets of incentives, whether or not under compulsion, and act under conditions of uncertainty, which 
is different from risk in that it is historical, not amenable to calculus. This is in contrast to the pure 
neoclassical ideal market, where the market is one single institutional setting in which both suppliers 
and demanders respond to the same incentives represented by a single variable: price, or wage as in 
the case of a labour market. It is only under this condition, i.e., a singular coordinated institutional 
setting, where market coordination might be postulated to lead towards definite market clearance, as 
in the case of commodity or financial markets.  
Keynes stipulated that these conditions rarely apply in the aggregate, and, in the case of labour 
markets, suppliers and demanders respond to different incentives guided by different institutional 
settings, although Keynes himself did not use this terminology of institutionalism. Labour demand is 
primarily determined by aggregate demand in the economy, which is influenced by consumers‘ 
propensity to consume, and businesses‘ expectations for future profits in their investment and 
production decisions, crucially underpinned by pervasive uncertainty, with wages playing a marginal 
influence on these more fundamental factors. The supply of labour may be marginally responsive to 
wage rates, but the aggregate supply is more fundamentally determined by the social or subsistence 
need to work, which to a large extent is driven by structural demographic factors that are not 
necessarily responsive to the incentives driving labour demand, as discussed in the first section of 
this paper. Wage rates may play some role in influencing these supply decisions at the margin, but 
this role is quite possibly minor in comparison to other structural factors, particularly under 
conditions of economic downturn when people have all the more need to work precisely because of 
falling wages, as noted by Heinz (2008, p. 13). Similarly, the intermediation of savings and 
investment in an economy cannot be considered a ‗market‘ in any analytically precise sense, given 
that these aggregates are mediated through complex and often disconnected sets of institutions and 
incentives, unlike individual money markets, which can be understood as markets in the proper 
sense. 
Keynes‘ contention, here interpreted using an institutionalist language and according to a post-
Keynesian reading, was that regulation is needed not only to correct for market imperfections, but, 
more fundamentally, as the very essence that guarantees a degree of equilibrium in aggregate 
pseudo-market conditions that are far from the abstract models of arbitrage in neoclassical theory. 
Such ‗markets‘ cannot be guaranteed to clear—i.e., to achieve full employment or an economy 
operating at full capacity—even under relatively free conditions, because supply and demand often 
respond to different incentives that are frequently uncoordinated, even if interrelated. A divergence 
between incentives can easily arise. Keynes‘ main contention was that market clearance would 
therefore be an exception even under perfect market conditions. Government management of 
aggregate demand and labour market regulation is required to achieve these outcomes in a complex 
modern industrial economy.  
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According to this argument, social or public regulation and non-market mediation ironically 
play integral roles in guaranteeing market clearance, even within efficient, competitive and close to 
perfect market conditions. This goes beyond the focus on the institutional foundations of markets, as 
analysed by authors such as Chang (2003), who as noted above argues that markets are instituted 
processes in ways that condition the behaviour of individuals and social groups, and give rise to 
correlated and often predictable patterns of human behaviour. Here, regulation implies more 
specifically the necessity for a degree of planning and management across the different sets of 
incentives operating in the ‗two blades of the scissors‘ (to paraphrase Alfred Marshall) of the 
aggregate processes of supply and demand. Such regulation is not simply a precondition for the 
effective functioning of markets, but is also an intrinsic element within such functioning, a point 
largely ignored in the New Institutional Economics literature given the abstracted neoclassical 
foundations from which its theories are built. 
SOCIAL SECURITY AS MARKET ENHANCING 
Mulheirn and Masters (2013) provide, perhaps not intentionally, an excellent example of such 
thinking with respect to the role of social security institutions in regulating the functioning of labour 
markets. Drawing from the work of a variety of economists, some of whom might ironically be 
identified as New Institutional Economics authors on other topics, they argue that sufficient degrees 
of social security can actually help to make the labour market function more effectively—rather than 
dampening incentives to work—because it allows people time to search for the right job. Search time 
is a function that, they argue, has been increasingly seen by economists as important for matching 
employee skills with employer needs, and for productivity in an increasingly skill-based economy. On 
this basis, and supported by the work of Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2006), among others, they argue that where 
unemployment insurance is too low, the labour market does not function effectively.  
Good matches lengthen job tenure, which improves employees‘ skills through both 
experience and their greater likelihood of receiving further training. Poor matches cause 
workers‘ prior skills to deteriorate, making past training redundant and raising staff 
turnover. And in an environment where getting people back to work immediately is the policy 
priority, there is little incentive for workers to invest in their own skills (Mulheirn and 
Masters 2013, p. 7).  
Hence, unemployment benefits can actually play a crucial role in allowing people time to search, not 
just for any job, but for the right job, and higher social security benefits in this sense can facilitate a 
more flexible workforce, in contrast to the more punitive versions of labour market activation 
policies that impose conditionalities on benefit recipients to speed the return to employment. 
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Mulheirn and Masters point out the work by Raj Chetty (2008) on how unemployed people with 
access to funds spend longer looking for the right job, even to the extent of using their own savings if 
benefits are too low or non-existent, implying that waiting is a worthy investment. This is in contrast 
to those who are compelled to move back to employment more quickly due to ‗liquidity constraints‘, 
and are thus not in a position to turn down unsuitable work relative to their skill sets and aptitudes. 
His research provides a powerful example of how unemployment insurance, for instance, can have a 
positive reinforcing effect on the functioning of labour markets, contrary to the ‗moral hazard‘ that is 
typically assumed to exist in the antipathy between markets and government-provided social 
security.  
While such analyses draw from a European and North American setting with fairly robust and 
well-developed social security systems, similar principles arguably hold in other contexts. For 
instance, parallels can be made with rural settings where people are still embedded within 
subsistence forms of production. As argued in Fischer (2006, 2008b, 2013b), based on fieldwork in 
western China, the autonomy from labour market dependence or labour commodification that rural 
households can achieve by maintaining an asset base sufficient to meet minimum subsistence 
requirements (‗subsistence capacity‘) represents a fundamental source of economic opportunity. It 
provides an ability to act strategically, primarily by avoiding dependence on subordinated forms of 
employment. Rural dwellers naturally seek autonomy from such dependence. One way is to embed 
themselves in an asset base, such as by investing in land and livestock, as a buffer against the 
potential disadvantages of labour commodification in the short term, even though social and 
economic structural changes might simultaneously undermine the sustainability of subsistence 
household livelihood strategies in the medium to long term.  
Subsistence in this way serves both an instrumental and symbolic or cultural wealth function 
within rural communities. Contrary to arguments that such valuation of subsistence is only a 
characteristic of those living close to destitution, the idea that subsistence is an instrument for wealth 
is comparable to the way that monetary wealth provides freedom within a fully commoditized non-
rural setting. As with the previous example on unemployment benefits, few would contest that the 
rich can do what they like with their disposable wealth, regardless of whether their actions are 
deemed rational or otherwise; this is the privilege of wealth. Similarly, the ability to be unemployed 
in most poor countries is actually an attribute of middle- or upper-class status; the truly poor have 
no capacity to be unemployed. They must work, whatever the work, and whatever the remuneration. 
This understanding of what it means to attain subsistence, and thus, in principle, to be a ‗subsistence 
farmer‘, may not accord with the ways that non-rural academics or policy makers expect ‗disciplined‘ 
or ‗deserving‘ poor to behave. But this is more likely due to a misreading of the clues rather than any 
developmental deficiency on the part of rural dwellers. 
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Along similar lines, an extension of the ‗commodity‘ or cash economy is not necessarily 
antithetical to these subsistence strategies. Contemporary rural dwellers across the global South are 
invariably involved with the commodity cash economy in various ways, some through choice and 
others through necessity, and thus they cannot base their livelihoods solely on subsistence household 
production, if ever they did, as noted by Hill (1986). This is partly because they purchase, consume 
or invest in modern goods, be they mobile phones, motorcycles or fertilizers, among many others. 
Perhaps more importantly, rapidly increasing fees for education and health care in many contexts act 
as strong compelling forces for rural dwellers to move into cash-earning activities, particularly in 
light of household livelihood strategies that target post-primary schooling for at least one child. 
Scarcity of rural cash-earning opportunities in turn drives rural to urban migration, as discussed in 
the previous section.  
The cash imperative is often overemphasized as a driver of labour commodification, however, 
given that it can easily coexist with subsistence livelihood strategies. In fact, the combination is ideal. 
If subsistence capacity is sufficient, it offers choice as to how and when to engage in cash-earning 
activities. It allows autonomy from a dependence on regular low-wage employment, or from the 
forced selling of produce at inopportune moments, both of which can have impoverishing 
implications. The ability to wait thereby confers an ability to access better opportunities if and when 
they arise.  
In this sense, the subjective proclivity for subsistence within rural communities is not merely 
cultural or symbolic. It also carries important instrumental wealth functions, not only in terms of the 
risk-averse insurance principle as argued by authors such as James Scott (1976), but also in terms of 
providing a position from which market and other forms of economic opportunity can be engaged in 
advantageously. In other words, the reinforcement of subsistence capacity can serve as an important 
wealth-supporting strategy within rural transitions into more marketized forms of production, 
exchange and employment. This was precisely the point of Hill (1986, pp. 18–20) in her criticism of 
the conventional usage of the concept of subsistence in much of development economics as implying 
poverty. She argued that it is usually only rich rural households that can hope to attain a degree of 
self-sufficiency, and she therefore critiqued the common assumption that traditional agriculture is 
characterized by degrees of subsistence, which are inversely related to market integration, given that 
this assumption ignores the role of inequality within such agricultural systems. Moreover, she 
pointed out that it is precisely the wealthy households that achieve some level of ‗subsistence‘ that 
also enjoy the most lucrative non-farming occupations. From this perspective, it is clear how 
achieving a minimum threshold of subsistence capacity for rural dwellers offers a freedom to act, 
whether for profit or non-profitable social approbation, and that this freedom is a crucial element for 
both subjective social values as well as objective economic values of employment. Similar to the case 
of unemployment insurance, a certain level of sufficiency and security can be understood to 
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strengthen market functioning rather than introducing dynamics of moral hazard or perverse 
incentives.  
CAPITALISM AS PLANNING AND REGULATION 
Such perspectives share considerable similarity with the social structures of accumulation approach, 
which, as argued by Harriss-White (2002), challenges the orthodox notion of economics as 
independent of the regulative environment in which production and distribution take place. 30 
Similarly, understanding of modern economic development (i.e., capitalism) arguably needs to be 
refined in terms of an appreciation for the rise of modern forms of organization and planning, 
whether in government or private corporations. In contrast to the glorification of ‗searchers‘ versus 
the demonization of ‗planners‘ by the likes of Easterly (2006) and the Hayekian tradition preceding 
him, the modern business corporation can be understood as representing an apex of planning (i.e., 
management) as the supreme modus operandi for mobilizing, capturing and controlling value and 
wealth in the contemporary global economy. The rise of administered exchange through the public 
sectors of all advanced industrial economies, unrelenting even in the face of so-called neoliberal 
reforms aimed at retrenching this state role in the economy, is testament to the fact that we need to 
conceive of capitalism not exclusively in terms of markets, but more broadly in terms of this 
increasing organizational and regulative capacity within both public and private spheres, both 
supported by redistributive mechanisms, progressive and regressive, and instituted through public 
and private channels.  
This aspect of economic development could be described as a form of capability, as a crucial 
‗economic facility‘, to use the terminology of Amartya Sen, or else as an important ‗social 
competency‘ (UNDP 2013), except one better conceived as a collective capability or competency to 
regulate and plan rather than to freely interact in a marketplace. It is perhaps better captured by the 
insights of Karl Polanyi (2001[1944]), who argued that the expansion of modern market systems is 
predicated precisely on the expansion of the regulatory function of modern states. Or to crudely 
paraphrase Joseph Schumpeter (1942), this regulatory function tends to grow proportionately in 
both private and public entities with the increasing complexity of economic and social systems. 
Similar to the rise of public sectors within modern economies, the managerial, regulatory and 
planning components of modern private corporations are proportionately much greater today than 
they were in the past.  
                                                          
30 See Harriss-White (2003) for an excellent discussion of markets as social and political institutions in developing 
economies. Also see Harriss-White (2010).  
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This point was poignantly made in the seminal work by Celso Furtado (1983; translated from 
the Portuguese edition of 1978), one of the founders of the Latin American school of structuralist 
economics and colleague of Raul Prebisch. Furtado identified the rise of industrial capitalism with 
the rise of unified planning—referred to as economic policy—which was achieved through the 
emergence of modern nation states from the mid-18th century onwards. This showed two relevant 
countervailing features: a progressive concentration of economic power and the highly effective 
organization of the wage-earning masses (ibid., p. 17). Within such ‗organized capitalism‘, which is 
best conceived as a system of social organization rather than simply a form of organizing production, 
―political power—conceived as capable of changing the behaviour of broad social groups—emerges as 
a complex structure in which the institutions comprising the State interact with the groups that 
dominate the accumulation process and with the social organizations capable of intervening in a 
significant way in the distribution of income‖ (ibid., p. 17). The challenge for contemporary 
developing countries, he argued, is that the increasing transnationalization of production weakens 
the ability of increasingly effective forms of social organization to exert pressure on the growing 
power of enterprises for a more immediate distribution of income (ibid., p. 21). While the power of 
―social organizations engaged in the struggle to raise the value of labour, that is, to bring about a 
more widespread social distribution of the benefits of the growing productivity of labour generated 
by accumulation…‖ (ibid., p. 27) was historically enhanced by the tendency of the state to broaden its 
social bases of support, the same tendency today is undercut by the fact that the power responsible 
for coordinating increasingly complex international economic relations has shifted, to a large extent, 
from the national state to the large enterprise (ibid., p. 23). From this somewhat prophetic 
perspective, written well in advance of the globalization literature of the 1990s, the subsequent 
emphasis on deregulation during the neoliberal years from the 1980s onwards can be understood as 
a further privatization of this macro-regulatory capacity rather than deregulation per se.  
The social valuation of labour in a development context 
As implied by Furtado, social and power relations guide the valuation of labour. Real markets and 
other economic processes, such as exchange operating through administered state channels or 
reciprocally through family and community channels, are embedded within social and power 
relations, or, as asserted by Furtado (1983), market operations ―are, as a rule, transactions between 
agents exercising unequal power‖ (p. 15).31 Competitive markets are always embedded in this sense, 
                                                          
31 ―The term ‗imperfect‘, when used by economists to describe market forms, is simply a euphemism to describe 
the ex post result of the will exercised by certain agents in such appropriation. Since all markets are to some 
extent ‗imperfect‘, exchange activities are bound to generate a process for concentrating wealth and power. 
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even though, as argued by Polanyi (2001[1944]), non-market forms of social organization come to be 
subordinated to the demands of ‗market society‘ under capitalism (a process he calls 
‗disembedding‘). Accordingly, the valuing of labour itself needs to be understood as a fundamentally 
social process. Attributes of physical productivity to a certain degree create floors and ceilings for the 
valuation of labour (or else ceilings on the value that can be appropriated from such labour), 
especially in relation to rural economies.32 Economic considerations of supply and demand also 
operate at the margin, i.e., as marginal adjustments to wage rates, but arguably not as primary 
determinants of value. Economic science, so to speak, has not solved the question of how labour is 
fundamentally valued.  
 It is important to exercise caution and a degree of critical distance from the ideas that 
productivity necessarily sets the value of labour, that poverty is due to ‗low productivity‘, or that 
increasing productivity needs to be at the forefront of an inclusive growth agenda, especially in a 
context whereby, as noted in the first section of this paper, labour forces are increasingly moving into 
the tertiary sector, where the idea of productivity becomes very problematic. I have called this a 
‗fallacy of productivity reductionism‘ (Fischer 2011c), referring to the assumption that monetary 
valuation can be used as an accurate approximation of productivity in a complex modern economy. 
Similar to early neoclassical theory in the late 19th century, which collapsed the distributional 
concerns of classical economics into a calculus of market allocation, this modern neoclassical 
assumption contributes to the myth that the rich are rich due to their greater productivity, and thus, 
by implication, that their wealth is a fair and just reward for effort. This assumption arguably lies at 
the heart of ideological efforts to legitimate the inequalities of the current world economic order, 
particularly with respect to the increasingly transnationalized networks that regulate the valuation of 
output produced by poor people working within them.  
The idea of a fallacy of productivity reductionism in part draws again from post-Keynesian 
insights. Perhaps the most practical insight that can be distilled from the otherwise highly abstract 
‗Cambridge capital controversies‘ of the 1960s is the point that, in a monetary world with 
heterogeneous goods and services, ‗capital‘ is effectively almost impossible to measure in any 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Hence the structural tendency, observable from the beginnings of industrial capitalism, toward the creation of 
large enterprises‖ (Furtado 1983, p. 15).  
32 In his classic article on inequality and economic growth, Kuznets (1955, pp. 7–8) posits that rural areas are less 
unequal than urban areas because there is greater potential for productivity increases in urban industry than in 
rural agriculture. Rural inequality is more restricted by the upper bound of productivity that can be achieved in 
agriculture, whereas urban inequality is much less so. He did not argue, as misrepresented by Milanovic (2011, p. 
9), that inequality is low in preindustrial societies because almost everybody is equally poor. Rather, he pointed 
out that, according to the available evidence at the time, ‗underdeveloped‘ countries were more unequal than 
developed countries (e.g., see Kuznets 1955, p. 20). 
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coherent aggregate sense, in contrast to neoclassical assumptions that treat capital as substitutable 
and more or less identical with consumption goods, such as corn for planting and consumption. 
Accordingly, aggregate ‗productivity‘ can only be understood in terms of monetary valuation, i.e., 
through prices, and not in physical terms—this point should be obvious with respect to services. Paul 
Samuelson (1966) implicitly conceded defeat in these debates to Joan Robinson and Piero Sraffa, 
although most mainstream economists subsequently ignored this concession, particularly from the 
1980s onwards.33  Instead, the profession continued to assume that complex modern industrial 
economies essentially function in the manner suggested by the one-good or identical two-good world 
imagined in the production functions of standard neoclassical theoretical models and the so-called 
New Keynesian variants. In these models, capital and productivity are treated as if they can be 
measured in physical terms, such as in the total factor productivity measures derived from the one-
good moneyless growth models of the Solow variant. The bulk of contemporary economics can thus 
be described as a faith-based discipline—a leap of faith is required to enter its temple of logic.  
Most mainstream approaches to measuring productivity almost always rely on value added 
accounting data in various ways as a means to approximate aggregate productivity, whether at 
industry, sectoral or economy levels. The justification for this was partly based on early econometric 
work by Kenneth Arrow, Hollis Chenery, Sinha Minhas and Robert Solow. Starting with the 
―empirical observation that the value added per unit of labour used within a given industry varies 
across countries with the wage rate,‖ these authors concluded that most of ―the variation in labour 
productivity is explained by variation in wage rates alone‖ (Arrow et al. 1961, pp. 225, 228). The 
implication is that variations in wage rates are mostly due to labour productivity. As pointed out by 
Felipe and McCombie (2001), however, these results were essentially the product of tautology—that 
is, ―the estimations of production functions [are simply] capturing an underlying accounting identity 
[that value added equals the wage bill plus profits]…. Hence, regressing output on the inputs is 
bound, almost by definition, to give a very good statistical fit‖ (p. 1222). To the extent that this 
contention is true, it undermines the whole edifice of aggregate productivity measures that have 
since been elaborated on the basis of the results of Arrow et al. (1961), as noted in subsequent work 
by Felipe and McCombie (e.g., see 2003, 2006 and 2012).  
The problem with using value added as a proxy for productivity is that it represents a 
combination of output (tangible and intangible) and prices/wages. ‗Productive‘ employment in the 
tertiary sector, for instance, is as much a reflection of wage rates as any notion of productive output 
per se—for example, what is the output of a lawyer or a bureaucrat? Use of value added as a 
shorthand for productivity leads to absurd logical implications, such as the suggestion that a barber 
                                                          
33 See Cohen and Harcourt (2003) for an excellent discussion of this point.  
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in the United States is 30 or more times more productive than a barber in India even though they 
both ‗produce‘ the same number of haircuts per hour, according to the tastes and expectations of 
their clients, simply because the wage of the barber in the United States is 30 or more times higher. 
Or else, within the United States, that the ‗productivity‘ of a lawyer is 20 times higher than that of a 
barber. The lawyer‘s labour is certainly more valued than the barber‘s, whether or not for good 
reason, but this has little to do with productivity, unless we consider that the power to leverage 
higher value for one‘s labour is, in itself, a form of productivity. The difference is usually explained in 
terms of ‗human capital‘, referring mostly to years of schooling and skills premiums, although similar 
wage differentials can be observed between employees with more or less equivalent levels of 
education, such as teachers versus lawyers, or a computer engineer in California versus one in 
Bangalore. In other words, much of what most conventional measures of productivity pick up 
actually amounts to price or wage differences, not actual effort, output or even skill, especially in 
economies increasingly based on services.  
The idea that monetary valuation can represent productivity is especially problematic with 
respect to the tertiary sector, given the notorious difficulties of measuring productivity in services. 
For instance, while some dimensions of productivity can be measured in some aspects of tertiary 
work, such as patients treated per doctor, students taught per teacher, numbers of sheets cleaned per 
domestic worker or merchandise sold in supermarkets per cashier, such measures are often 
deceptive in that the quality of the good regularly changes through the process of increasing outputs. 
This would be the case with more children per classroom leading to worse learning outcomes, or less 
care in serving hospital patients. Such measures are not necessarily measuring a consistently 
comparable good, as would be the case with physical measures of identical goods, such as tonnes of 
wheat. Even in the case of wholesale and retail trade where productivity measures (for example, 
merchandise sold per employee per unit of time) and the application of technology are relevant, 
increases in productivity—especially in retail trade—often imply shifting labour and time costs onto 
customers, which makes activities profitable but not necessarily more productive from a broader 
perspective.  
 It is somewhat nonsensical and arbitrary to use the standard lexicon of ‗labour intensity‘, 
versus capital intensity, to explain wage differentials within the tertiary sector or in comparison to 
other sectors. Almost by definition, service sector activities are largely or in many cases entirely 
based on labour inputs rather than capital inputs. The logic only works by analogy if we include 
problematic notions of ‗human capital‘, which are usually proxied by years of schooling and basically 
refer to formal education. The evidence that differences in education can predict wage differences—
across countries, but also across service sectors within a country—is increasingly weak, particularly 
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in the face of higher and broader schooling attainments at lower wage levels or in poorer countries.34 
Tertiary sector professionals, such as lawyers, are not usually referred to as having labour-intensive 
jobs, even though, in capital labour terms, most if not all input involves labour.35 Presumably, these 
jobs are not referred to as labour intensive either because these professionals generate high value per 
unit of labour time or because education is taken to be a proxy for capital. This is unlike the case for 
nurses or schoolteachers, who have similar levels of education in terms of degree types, but at much 
lower levels of value added; their professions are often referred to as labour intensive.  
In other words, there is a certain degree of tautology at work. Labour intensity is associated with 
relatively lower wages, and when relatively lower wages are observed, the labour is assumed to be 
more labour intensive, even though both labour intensity and labour productivity are nonsensical 
reference points in the measurement of the outputs of intangible services, the value of which is 
mostly based on the value of the labour inputs. Rather, wage differences are arguably related to the 
social and institutional processes of valuing various categories of service sector labour, driven by 
power relations, ideological factors, socialization, and related processes of social stratification and 
differentiation, instead of considerations ostensibly related to labour productivities within the 
production of comparable goods or services.36  
The mainstream response to the quandary of productivity in services usually refers to Baumol‘s 
‗cost disease‘. Baumol and Bowen (1966) attempted to explain the apparent paradox of rising salaries 
in jobs that experience no increase in labour productivity, such as in the performing arts, where the 
same number of people is required to play a symphony as a century earlier. This is in comparison to 
rising salaries in jobs that do experience labour productivity increases, such a manufacturing, and 
                                                          
34 Most early assumptions on this were based on cross-country regressions whereby richer countries generally had 
much higher levels of formal schooling. This association becomes progressively weak, however, the more poorer 
countries progress in levels of formal schooling without necessarily experiencing the economic benefits associated 
with equivalent levels in earlier cases. As with fertility in demography, human development has become 
increasingly disassociated from economic development. It is a classic case of misattributing causality with 
association. For a good discussion on other related points, see Felipe (2010, pp. 279–288). 
35 Let us assume that overheads such as expensive lawyers‘ offices are not part of productive capital, but are 
status-signalling devices, because a lawyer can be equally effective working at home or in a public library.  
36 The only sector where very clear labour productivity differences can be observed between the North and South 
today—enough to explain the wealth differences between the two—is agriculture (for instance, Canadian farming 
versus Indian farming). Such labour productivity differences cannot even be seen in manufacturing anymore; 
Chinese factory workers, for example, are as productive in producing the same manufactured goods as workers in 
the United States or Europe, despite much lower wages. Value in manufacturing today is accrued more in terms of 
product differentiation or component differentiation along value chains, and control over production and 
distribution networks. This includes control over the more technological and knowledge-intensive parts of the 
value chain, although the point here is that wage differences cannot be discerned through simple comparisons of 
labour productivity in the physical output of the same or comparable goods. 
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seemingly contradicts the standard assumption that wages are closely associated with changes in 
labour productivity, as discussed above. The answer was essentially that wages in sectors without 
productivity gains increase because they must compete for employees with the sectors with 
productivity gains. The analysis is notably built on differentiating physical production from services, 
and presumes that productivity in the latter can be measured using standard total factor productivity 
techniques. The very fact that wage equalization across the economy might be seen as a ‗disease‘ is 
itself indicative of the particular perspective informing this approach.  
Triplett and Bosworth (2003) claim that the disease has been cured on the basis of evidence of 
rising productivity growth in service sectors in the United States after 1995. Their measurement of 
such productivity, however, relies on the standard productivity growth accounting framework 
originating from the work of Solow (1957), whereby labour productivity is measured as the value 
added output per person engaged in production. Their approach remains bogged down in a variety of 
theoretical and methodological issues, many of which they admittedly acknowledge. For instance, 
they exclude social services from their calculations because of difficulties surrounding the treatment 
of capital in such industries. On the treatment of capital in other service industries, they 
acknowledge the problems of relying on capital stock data at the industry level as a measure of 
capital input, given that these data are dominated by financial wealth, not simply ‗productive‘ capital 
stock used as an input to production. They propose a resolution of this problem by combining such 
data with flow data on capital services by industry. Anderson et al. (2009), in a review of methods 
commonly used to measure capital service flows, point out, however, that a variety of important 
assumptions are used in constructing such measures. Even in the case of the relatively easy to 
measure capital inputs to agriculture in the United States, they demonstrate that substantial 
differences in these measures can be computed depending on which assumptions are chosen.  
Beyond these technical issues, a more fundamental problem with this line of analysis is that it 
assumes that wages in the physical production sectors are somehow related to labour productivity, 
which can in turn be measured in non-problematic real terms despite the reliance on value added 
data, as discussed above. This was precisely the problem that Arthur Lewis addressed in his classic 
(and often poorly regurgitated) pioneering contribution to development economics. One of the two 
key puzzles that he was trying to solve was the question of, ―Why is tropical produce so cheap?‖ 
Take for example the case of sugar. This is an industry in which productivity is extremely 
high... [with] a rate of growth of productivity which is unparalleled by any other major 
industry in the world—certainly not by the wheat industry. Nevertheless workers in the sugar 
industry continue to walk barefooted and to live in shacks, while workers in wheat enjoy 
among the highest living standards in the world (Lewis 1954, p. 442). 
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To answer this question, he focused on factoral terms of trade in the open economy version of his 
model of economic growth with unlimited supplies of labour. In what might be seen as Baumol‘s cost 
disease pre-emptively turned on its head, he argued that because wages are set in what he called 
‗subsistence sectors‘ rather than in capitalist export sectors, the benefits of increasing productivity in 
the latter accrue chiefly to the (northern) importers of these exports by way of lower prices, given the 
unlimited supply of labour available to the capitalist sector at a wage set sufficiently higher than what 
can be earned in the subsistence sectors. He contended that ―the prices of tropical commercial crops 
will always permit only subsistence wages until, for a change, capital and knowledge are put at the 
disposal of the subsistence producers to increase the productivity of tropical food production for 
home consumption‖ (ibid., p. 442) The implication of his argument, which is now usually overlooked 
in deference to a caricature of his theory of growth with unlimited supplies of labour, is that wages 
are not reflected by productivity, even in physical production, and that increasing productivity in 
physical production will not necessarily result in rising wages, at least not under the conditions of an 
open and poor economy with substantial supplies of labour available to work in the so-called 
‗capitalist‘ sectors. 
Later in his life, Lewis (1978, p. 36) similarly predicted that even as developing countries would 
move into manufacturing exports, these would function in a manner similar to the previous 
agricultural export commodities; increasing productivity would simply reduce export prices, and 
terms of trade would continue declining. Based on evidence regularly presented by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),37 this prediction appears to have borne 
true in the three decades since he made it, at least for the huge increase in southern manufacturing 
exports integrated into international production networks dominated by transnational corporations.  
The idea that inter-country differences in wage rates can be explained by obstructions to the free 
flow of goods, services and capital across borders also becomes increasingly absurd the more the 
global economy liberalizes and becomes increasingly unequal as well. This fallacy is especially 
pertinent when considered in light of the increasing transnationalization of production and 
distribution in the post-war era, although it was also very relevant during the colonial era for similar 
reasons. For instance, when an increase in the value added of the tertiary sector is recorded in the 
United States or Europe—such as in the categories of management, finance, marketing, trade, or 
research and development—this is usually interpreted as increasing productivity in those sectors and 
in the economy if there is overall economic growth. Yet at least part of such an increase might well 
represent processes of financialization, for instance, whereby levels of remuneration in the financial 
sector are allowed to rise to unheard-of heights, and then might be interpreted as improving 
                                                          
37 See UNCTAD (2007, pp. 11–12) or UNCTAD (2002, pp. 113–138) for more detailed discussion. 
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‗productivity‘ within that sector as a result. Or expansion in these categories might partially 
represent inflows of profits through a wide variety of channels from southern subsidiaries to the 
headquarters of northern transnational corporations, often via various offshore financial centres. 
When a transnational corporation practises transfer pricing, or equivalent practices that have 
become standard in international accountancy, as a means of transferring profits from a southern 
subsidiary to a head office in New York or London, the subsidiary appears less productive as a result.  
The head office appears more productive, insofar as productivity is measured in value added terms, 
even though most head office activities would be in services, not physical production. Ironically, the 
actual producers of goods, who are increasingly located in the global South, might well be accused of 
being inefficient in value terms and in need of extra structural adjustment, even though the 
appearance of such inefficiency is in many cases the product of accountancy practices, and such 
producers might be otherwise working very diligently and investing in a whole myriad of ways to 
keep up with the competition. In such circumstances, the precise meaning of ‗being productive‘ is 
difficult to pin down, except in cases of the physical output of comparable goods. 
This was a key insight in the work on transnational corporations in Latin America by earlier 
structuralists such as Osvaldo Sunkel (1972) and Constantine Vaitsos (1973). These authors 
highlighted the often deleterious effects of rising transnational ownership structures on domestically 
oriented forms of productive accumulation, including problems of polarization and marginalization 
within these countries. Their insights presumably hold ever more relevance today given the 
subsequent and mostly unregulated proliferation of the practices they analysed.38 Even in the case of 
China, a large proportion of the current trade surplus probably represents transfer pricing by foreign 
corporations, as one among several illicit means of moving capital into China, which in turn is 
facilitated by the fact that foreign corporations officially account for over half of China‘s trade 
surplus.39  
These issues highlight the importance of ownership and/or control over processes of value 
circulation in monetary economies, and the insidious siphoning of wealth that usually results from a 
dominance of foreign ownership in the peripheral economies of the global South.40 Effective outflows 
of wealth, whether through licit or illicit capital flows, or else through subtle processes such as 
transfer pricing, undermine the monetary aggregate demand in these economies, which would 
otherwise contribute towards enhancing employment generation as well as the fiscal revenues 
required to finance comprehensive social policies. National ownership thus plays a hugely important 
                                                          
38 For instance, see Bernard et al. (2008). 
39 See Yu (2006, 2013) and Fischer (2010c, 2010d) for further discussion. 
40 See Ndikumana and Boyce (2011) for some interesting estimates of capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa.  
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role in efforts to retain wealth within national economies, thereby capturing the benefits of 
productivity increases when and where these take place. It has been one of the principle targets of 
ideological attack under the last 30 years of neoliberalism, with the front line currently targeting 
China under the guise of accusations of currency manipulation.41  
Raising productivity in the global South is obviously an important component of poverty 
alleviation and efforts to reduce inequality, particularly if the resulting wealth is used in ways that 
genuinely improve well-being among the poor. For instance, small-scale farmers would obviously 
benefit from raising their output on both their existing plots of land and, ideally, on enlarged land 
holdings, which, by implication, would require land reform—at least so long as the costs of increasing 
their output would not exceed the benefits. Such self-evident examples, however, are often used to 
simplify and legitimize the more generalized patterns of inequality in the world today, which are 
much more obscure in terms of a direct connection between effort or output and poverty. The 
underlying fallacy of productivity reductionism is imperative to recognize, because, otherwise, an 
obsession with raising productivity risks being turned into a powerful ethos for disciplining an 
increasingly southern global workforce together with nationally based productive capitalists, both 
subordinated into global networks of production and distribution that increasingly control the most 
lucrative flows of value in the world economy.  
SOCIAL VALUATION AND POLITICAL BARGAINS 
Contemporary poverty and inequality reduction in our monetary world cannot necessarily be 
achieved by making poor people work harder and better, but by addressing how their work is valued. 
Valuation is often only marginally related to productivity, particularly as populations move out of 
agriculture, bypass manufacturing and enter the service sectors, where wages are effectively a 
reflection of social processes of valuation, more so than in tangible production sectors. Social 
valuation is particularly pliable to politicized social bargains with respect to the norms governing 
such valuation.  
This relates back to an important thesis made by Furtado (1983, pp. 15–17) regarding the 
increase in the average real wage rate in classical cases of industrial capitalism that almost always 
managed to keep pace with the rise in the average productivity of labour or with the increase in the 
capital allocation per worker, as a counterpart to the structural tendency towards the relative scarcity 
of labour in systems with a more advanced accumulation. He contended that:  
                                                          
41 See Fischer (2010c).  
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…though rapid accumulation was certainly a necessary element in the increase in 
remuneration for workers, it would be wrong to regard it as the effective cause. Given the 
enormous concentration of economic power, which gave rise to the sophisticated forms of 
market control that came to prevail, it is more than likely that, without the organization of 
the working masses and the combative spirit they have historically displayed, the evolution of 
industrial capitalism would have taken the line of a greater social concentration of income, 
possibly combined with a more vigorous external expansion, or an increase in public 
expenditure for prestige purposes, external aggression, or something similar. The form of 
society that came to prevail in industrial capitalist countries was not a historical necessity but 
simply a historical possibility. And if this possibility materialized, it was in large measure 
thanks to the power progressively exercised through the organization of the large social 
majorities who earn their livelihood by selling their labour capacity on the market (pp. 16–
17). 
As noted in the previous section, Furtado placed great emphasis on the historical conjuncture in this 
early phase of industrial capitalism that allowed for a positive synergy between the evolution of 
economic and political power.  
This emphasis on social mobilization as a crucial institutional factor influencing the valuation of 
labour and hence the potential for rising wages with rising productivity is also echoed in the thesis of 
Gøsta Esping-Anderson. Esping-Anderson (1990, p. 29) argues that the development of welfare 
states in the Anglo-European and Japanese cases—a massive historical factor influencing distributive 
and redistributive processes—was influenced by three factors in particular: the nature of class 
mobilization, especially of the working class, keeping in mind the increasing imprecision of this 
concept and the changing role of so-called middle classes in the contemporary context; class-political 
coalition structures; and the historical legacy of regime institutionalization. The differing paths 
resulting from diverse historical constellations of these factors, in the form of social policy for 
instance, have had major impacts on shaping both social rights and social stratification within each 
country.  
Both authors would undoubtedly source the causes of stagnant average wages in the United 
Kingdom, the United States or other countries over the last 30 years to the undermining of classical 
social mobilizations and class-political coalitions under neoliberalism, rather than to any causes 
related to labour productivity. As noted above, conventional measures of labour productivity have 
been rising during this period in the United States, even in the service sector. Beyond the specificities 
of the various theoretical arguments, a key element is the role of distributive and redistributive 
social, political and institutional mechanisms in socializing the benefits of growing productivity, and 
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the costs of providing socially acceptable forms of employment to increasingly tertiarized and, in 
many cases, educated labour forces.  
SOCIAL VALUATION AND THE CARE ECONOMY 
The care economy provides a pertinent example since it accounts for a growing proportion of tertiary 
sector employment, often involving quite skilled categories of labour. It is also increasingly 
embedded within globalized labour networks, or what Parreñas (2000) has termed the ‗international 
division of reproductive labour‘ and Hochschild (2000) the ‗global care chain‘. One prominent 
discussion within the care economy literature is on the empirically demonstrable undervaluation of 
care labour relative to other types of labour with equivalent education and skill levels, e.g., see Folbre 
and Nelson (2000), England et al. (2002), Razavi (2011), and Palmer and Eveline (2012). Much of 
this discussion revolves around issues of labour intensity and the inherent tension, as discussed by 
Palmer and Eveline (2012), between the marketing of high-quality care services and attempts to 
control their costs, which are mostly related to labour. They point to the perplexing situation where 
wages are too low to attract workers, which in turn encourages an increasing reliance on immigrant 
labour, at least in the richer countries that can afford this option. Palmer and Eveline do not explore 
this point further, given that they focus instead on the discursive processes by which employers in 
the Australian aged care sector justify and sustain low pay for work that is both highly skilled and in 
high demand. Their case provides a valuable example, however, of how this care labour market, 
within a relatively liberalized setting, is not working as predicted by standard neoclassical theory. An 
excess of demand over supply would normally raise wages, but instead, in this case and others across 
Europe and North America, it drives a shift in social norms regarding the valuation of such labour as 
well as the categories of people deemed suitable for supplying it. The demand for immigrant labour 
in these cases would appear to follow downward wage pressures, rather than being a cause of 
downward wage pressures, as would be typically postulated by comparative advantage explanations 
for falling wages in rich countries in a context of globalization.  
The inherent problem in these cases is not with the ‗labour intensity‘ of the skilled labour 
involved, but more precisely in the reliance on a business model in which the costs of providing such 
skilled labour is more or less entirely internalized within the business unit, whether profit or not-for-
profit, and paid for largely through private means. Under these conditions, and where average wages 
are stagnant, potentially enormous disjunctures emerge, such as in the current ‗care crisis‘ in the 
United States, where a single parent in most states working a minimum wage job 40 hours a week for 
52 weeks a year does not earn enough to put two young children in a child-care centre, according to 
average annual state costs (Diehm 2013). As argued by Razavi (2011), the failure to socialize the costs 
of care in these and other settings will inevitably feed into and exacerbate existing inequalities, in 
particular by increasing the costs of essential social needs faced by the less advantaged half (or more) 
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of the workforce, while at the same time producing strong downward pressures on wages within 
service provisioning, thereby contributing further to the stagnation of average wages and so forth.  
The key to interrupting this downward cycle is through socializing the costs of care. This 
arguably requires universalistic forms of decommodification to sever the link between the costing 
and supply of services, in both quantity and quality, or between the pricing of services and the wages 
involved in supplying them. 42  Such decommodification, in order to be financially sustainable, 
arguably also requires removing the pricing of services from market intermediation, given that, as 
contended in Fischer (2012), uncontrolled market pricing within health care systems, for instance, is 
a crucial factor undermining the sustainability and effectiveness of health insurance reforms in 
countries as varied as China, India and the United States. Similarly, redistributive mechanisms are 
required to finance such decommodified provisioning by tapping into the increasing, albeit 
increasingly concentrated, productivity in other parts of the economy. Such systemic principles are 
precisely the ingredients behind successful models of universalistic health systems, whereby services 
are provided according to need, and are of the best quality possible; prices are regulated 
administratively, without consideration for demand at the time of need; and costs are financed 
indirectly via progressive taxation, hence allowing for salaries within the sector to be determined 
apart from the cost of providing the services or from the financial viability of one particular unit 
supplying services, if it were hypothetically forced to function as a private unit, for instance. This 
thereby allows for spreading the costs of offering socially acceptable wages and working conditions 
within the sector, in accordance with the skill levels of labour required, in a manner that is similar to 
the principles of insurance.  
In contrast, the self-contained business model of private provisioning actually concentrates 
costs very inefficiently on individual units. This is in much the same way that food shortages result in 
localized famines in the absence of mechanisms to disperse costs, in the manner that national 
markets are typically presumed to do through rising prices, as once argued by Thomas Malthus (see 
Wrigley 1999). In this respect, the private business model would appear very unsuited for social 
needs provisioning. This does not mean that private provisioning units cannot operate within a 
socialized model. Rather, it implies that if such social needs, which all human beings invariably have 
for at least several ‗captive‘, non-withdrawable periods during their life cycle,43  are treated as 
                                                          
42 Note that this usage of the term ‗decommodification‘ is slightly different from the way it is used by Esping-
Anderson (1990), who applies the term with reference to labour markets. The reference here is more precisely to 
something being treated or not as a commodity. See Fischer (2012).  
43 Universality of social needs with respect to the human condition is distinct from the increasingly specialized 
character of physical production—especially manufactures—in which a smaller and smaller proportion of the 
population has any direct contact with or precise knowledge about the production processes involved. This 
fundamental difference provides the structural principle for universalistic modes of provisioning in social policy 
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commodities in a market, they effectively become fictitious commodities—to borrow from Polanyi 
(2001[1944])—in the sense that they are not ‗produced‘ for buying and selling on the market. 
Treating them as if they are can be very destructive for the social fabric.44  
An excellent example of these principles can be found in the work of Ilkkaracan (2012) on the 
role of public and social policies in influencing women‘s labour force participation, with a particular 
emphasis on time-related work-family reconciliation policies, such as those related to care leave, its 
gender distribution and work hours, as well as the provision and subsidization of care services. In a 
comparative study of seven OECD countries, Sweden in particular stood out as a ―haven in terms of 
the generous combination of care-related leave for both men and women plus wide spread access to 
high-quality public childcare services... [France and Sweden] have some of the best gender equality 
indicators in labour market and enjoy relatively higher fertility rates in the European context despite 
high rates of female labour market activity‖ (p. 326). Child-care services in Sweden follow a 
socialized model of free universalistic provisioning funded by progressive taxation, in striking 
contrast to the situation in the United States, as described above. This leads to entirely different 
results in terms of the participation and integration of women into the formal workforce as well as 
the valuing of women‘s labour and, ultimately, the social value derived from their employment.  
The redistributive imperative in development 
While most examples of robust national social insurance systems are drawn from the classic well-
developed welfare states of northern Europe and its offshoots, such systems are non-extant in most 
developing countries. Even though it might not be possible to replicate the institutional forms of 
these classic cases, which developed under very particular historical circumstances, it is important to 
explore the operating principles underlying them as a basis for social policy innovations in 
developing countries today. Along these lines, it is useful to conceive these principles more broadly in 
terms of redistributive institutional mechanisms that allow for socializing wealth, rather than in 
terms of the more historically specific institutional forms of modern welfare states and associated 
social policy.  
 Returning to the first section of this paper, a key development question concerns how to 
channel wealth generated by rising productivity in the primary and secondary sectors of poorer 
developing countries into the tertiary sector of employment, and how to prevent wealth from being 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
versus targeting in industrial policy, inverse to the logic in mainstream development policy as noted by 
Mkandawire (2005).  
44 See Mackintosh (2006) for an interesting discussion on this point. 
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siphoned out of these economies altogether through a variety of increasingly sophisticated channels 
within ever more transnationalized networks of production and distribution. Presuming that raising 
productivity in the primary sector is limited in the short term, these countries would arguably need 
to institute strong redistributive mechanisms to guarantee that a substantial portion of the wealth 
generated by more and more productive manufacturing or enclave sectors such as mining would be 
circulated throughout the rest of the economy in such a manner as to generate decently paid and 
relatively ‗productive‘ employment in the largely urban tertiary sector. This principle draws from 
earlier European cases of industrialization, in which instituting universalistic social policy, in 
combination with other factors such as out-migration and inflows of colonial wealth, arguably served 
as a key redistributive mechanism. It allowed (labour) productivity gains in agriculture and industry 
to be circulated towards the tertiary sector, in a manner that drove formalization of the labour force, 
as well as rising wages and non-wage standards of employment, including gender equality standards. 
Redistributive principles were key contingencies to establishing a strong social value of employment 
in this transitional context of development. 
The importance of social policy stems in part from its role in directly redistributing wealth or in 
influencing initial distributions of wealth through setting or influencing wage and employment 
standards. In addition, various social policy sectors such as education and health are central in 
structuring inequality and opportunity. Social policy affects labour supply in the long term by 
contributing to slowing population growth from peak natural population increase rates once 
demographic transition is in course, as in all countries today, through death control as the remote 
determinant of fertility decline, as well as family planning and education, which are both important 
proximate determinants of fertility decline.45 Social policy plays a complementary role in influencing 
public sector employment, which in turn would need to take on a prominent role in tertiary sector 
employment generation. This is because much of redistribution happens through state channels; 
because of the important and under-acknowledged role of public employment in setting standards 
and even wage levels in an economy; and because it is effectively the coveted target of the 
employment expectations of increasingly well-educated young populations in the global South. In all 
of these dimensions, universalistic social policy supported by progressive taxation systems is 
arguably superior to targeted or residualist approaches to social policy.46  
 The standard retort to such a principle—from many spectrums—is that poor countries need 
to focus first on productive accumulation in order to create the surplus to redistribute, or else risk 
populist redistributions that undermine the growth process. The counter-argument to this position 
                                                          
45 See Fischer (2010b, 2011a) for further discussion of these demographic points. 
46 See Mkandawire (2005) for a seminal synthesis of these arguments. 
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can be found in the seminal work on late industrialization by Gershenkron (1962), who clearly 
documented that the classic late industrializers (e.g., Germany, Japan and the Russian Federation) 
typically instituted moves towards more universalistic forms of social policy and related 
redistributive public policies earlier than would have been expected by the experience of previous 
industrializers, if not earlier in actual historical time, as in the case of Germany versus the United 
Kingdom. These public policy initiatives were central components of successful late industrialization 
strategies, alongside the ability to leapfrog in technological progress through the adoption and 
adaptation of more advanced technologies from industrial leaders (education was obviously key to 
the capability to leapfrog). In this sense, a Gershenkronian principle is that the later the 
industrializer and the larger the catch-up required, the greater the imperative to pre-empt and 
support industrialization with strong redistributive mechanisms, including the universalization of 
social policy as a central component. A demographic corollary might be also postulated that this 
imperative becomes greater the later and faster the demographic transition, given that this results in 
faster and more pronounced ‗demographic dividends‘ precisely at a time when productive industries 
are absorbing less and less labour, hence intensifying the need for employment generation in tertiary 
sectors, relative to earlier industrializers and demographic transitions.  
Beyond the classical late industrializers, these principles were also demonstrated by the East 
Asian examples of successful late industrialization, namely, the frequently discussed cases of the 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. The means by which these countries were 
remarkably successful at both rapidly reducing fertility and generating employment—and hence, 
speeding up and then profiting from the so-called ‗demographic dividend‘—were generally 
characterized by a combination of strong developmentalism and universalistic social policies in basic 
education and health. Universalism was not applied to social welfare, which remained quite 
minimalist and family-based up until the 1990s, which is an important distinction from the 
development of European welfare states. 47  Developmentalism in this sense refers to state-led 
industrial policy rooted in nationally owned firms, regulated capital accounts to ensure that wealth 
remains national, and a bias towards generating employment rather than efficiency. This is the 
opposite of the neoliberal dictates that demand employment austerity in the name of (transnational) 
firm profitability. Equally important and often underappreciated are the variety of strongly 
redistributive institutional mechanisms outside of the realm of social policy, as means of dispersing 
wealth across society in a manner that synergistically generated employment in tertiary service 
sectors and supported industrialization strategies, such as extensive land reform and the rapid 
expansion of the education system above the primary level in the early 1950s. Notably, these radical 
initiatives were mostly taken at a time when both countries were largely agrarian and very poor. Both 
                                                          
47 See Kwon (2005) and Ringen et al. (2011) for excellent discussions of this in the case of the Republic of Korea.  
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were also supported by substantial amounts of foreign aid. Generous aid was due to geopolitical 
considerations, although this point should not take away from the importance of the international 
redistributive principle in strategically supporting such broader development strategies.48  
While the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China are obvious examples of where 
synergies between developmentalism and redistributive principles worked well, China provides 
another interesting case of broader redistributive principles, albeit not necessarily in the form of 
universalization of social policy until recently. From a narrow social policy frame, China might not 
appear to be the most obvious case to highlight, given the retreat from universalistic social 
provisioning in the early reform period in the early 1980s, and the troubled and faltering attempts to 
return to that direction since the late 1990s.49 The erosion of more universalistic forms of social 
policy in post-Mao China has been a major source of both inequality and social instability. 
Nonetheless, in widening the scope of redistributive mechanisms, important principles become 
obvious as important preconditions that contributed to growth from the 1980s onwards, and also as 
crucial factors for stabilizing and sustaining the growth model and avoiding its more egregious 
tendencies. These elements have been often underemphasized in the presentation of China‘s 
successes, even in the 2013 Human Development Report (UNDP 2013), but are vital to 
understanding how China has been attempting to leverage its success in both economic growth and 
human development to move towards a progressive formalization of its workforce, including through 
rising wages and related benefits.  
In terms of preconditions, China‘s success in reducing fertility from a rate of 5.8 in 1970 to 2.8 
by 1979—before the introduction of the one-child policy—cannot be appreciated without 
understanding the entirely state-collectivized economy at the time. Collectivization assured full 
employment and the near universal provision of primary health care and basic education in both 
                                                          
48 See Fischer (2009b) for further discussion of this point. 
49  Appleton, Song and Xia (2010) inadvertently make this point in their critique of targeted welfare in this 
intervening period. They argue that government anti-poverty programmes in China had little impact on urban 
poverty between 1988 and 2002. Instead, through an econometric analysis of urban household survey data, they 
contend that urban poverty had fallen almost entirely due to overall economic growth rather than ‗redistribution‘. 
The misconstrued element in their argument is that they refer not so much to redistribution but, more specifically, 
to targeting, given that China‘s urban anti-poverty programmes were heavily oriented towards means-tested 
targeting within an overall retreat from more universalistic principles over the 1980s and 1990s, including the 
rapid erosion of most pre-existing redistributive and/or social security systems, and a notably regressive shift in 
the burden of taxation (e.g., see Khan and Riskin 2001). In this context, it can hardly be said that targeted poverty 
reduction programmes constituted a strong case for redistribution. Rather, targeted social assistance probably 
represented one of the few marginal factors compensating for an overall regressive shift in the social policy regime 
of China. Most poverty reduction could be shown through econometrics to have come from growth, although this 
can hardly be used as a case against redistributive polices. With this corrective in mind, the argument of these 
authors otherwise well corroborates the arguments discussed here.  
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rural and urban areas, at least to a level that allowed for the rapid dissemination of new practices and 
socially transformative messages. The contribution of these earlier social achievements to 
subsequent economic growth from the 1980s onwards is often under-appreciated, although they 
have been recognized as central to the fact that China had already far outperformed India in human 
development terms by the 1970s. Despite starting from about the same life expectancy at birth in the 
late 1940s, China was more than 1o years ahead of India by 1970. The United Nations (2013) 
estimates that life expectancy at birth for both sexes combined from 1975 to 1980 was 66.3 years in 
China versus 54.2 years in India. Similarly, China achieved a literacy rate by 1982 (around 70 percent 
of the population aged 15 and older) that was higher than that of India in 2001 (65 percent of the 
population aged 7 and older). These differences have been increasingly recognized as fundamental to 
the divergent development trajectories of the two countries, such as in the latest book by Drèze and 
Sen (2013).  
 Despite the collapse in the 1980s of China‘s universalistic system of basic health insurance 
and social protection that had been instituted under Maoism, certain other aspects of redistribution 
have been central to the ongoing stability and sustainability of the country‘s growth experience. One 
obvious foundation was that rural decollectivization in the early 1980s was effectively equivalent to a 
massive land reform programme. Continuous adjustments to this system of land tenure up to the 
present have resulted in one of the most egalitarian distributions of land assets (or rural usufruct 
rights) in the developing world. 50  For better or worse, the Government relied heavily on this 
egalitarian base to compensate for the erosion of rural social security from the early 1980s onwards; 
it was able to neglect other forms of rural social security reform for more than a decade.  
As another example of redistribution, while it has been much criticized by liberal economists, 
the financial system in China remains largely if not mostly under state ownership at various levels. 
This means that it can be used in a developmentalist manner, for instance, to subsidize major 
development initiatives that might include white elephants, but also those contributing to rising 
incomes in many rural areas. Well-subsidized rural credit in China has made the provisioning of 
costly and effectively regressive microfinance more or less irrelevant. As noted in the second section 
of this paper, Huang (2012) argues that the bulk of township and village enterprises in China from 
their inception were essentially private, and that the financial context of the 1980s was one of 
liberalization, which was subsequently reversed in the 1990s. Even if this argument is accepted as 
true, it does not take away from the egalitarian foundations of reform in the rural areas, as well as 
the fact that much of the initial rise in rural incomes in the first half of the 1980s was due to an 
                                                          
50 For an excellent discussion of the continuous adjustments to this system in order to maintain equal land access, 
see Brandt et al. (2002). On the equalizing contribution of land assets to rural household inequality in China in the 
1990s, see Khan and Riskin (2001).  
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administered sharp increase in the terms of trade for farm goods, in addition to the one-off incentive 
effects of returning to an individual household land tenure system.  
Other redistributive mechanisms include major fiscal reforms in the mid-1990s, which shifted 
the control of total national government revenue away from the provinces and back to the central 
Government. The central share of total revenues increased from 22 percent in 1993 to almost 
57 percent in 1994 (China National Bureau of Statistics 2011, table 8-3), which in turn allowed the 
central Government to reinvigorate regional development strategies that had effectively become 
moribund since the advent of fiscal decentralization in the early 1980s, in large part through 
increasing transfer payments to interior and western provincial governments, and thereby allowing 
them to run substantially increased budget deficits.51 This fuelled a remarkable economic recovery in 
the hitherto stagnant regional economies of interior and western China, which had been seriously 
lagging behind the coastal growth experience with high and in some cases rising levels of poverty. 
Despite the egregious aspects of such regional development strategies, particularly in minority 
nationality areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang (e.g., see Fischer 2005, 2013b),52  these relatively 
massive redistributive transfers from east to west in China via the fiscal intermediation of the central 
Government have been important to its attempts since the mid-1990s to reorient its growth model 
towards domestic demand, and to deal with regional inequality as one of the key dimensions of rising 
overall inequality, in addition to urban-rural inequality. The emergence of western industrial hubs 
such as Chongqing, Chengdu, Xi‘an and Lanzhou has been closely related to such policies.  
China has also practised a degree of regional wage equalization across state sector employment 
in urban areas, adjusted according to local cost of living. Through such wage policies, it has also 
instituted rapid real wage increases within such employment from the 1990s onwards on a nation-
wide scale. For instance, nominal average wages of employees in state-owned urban units rose from 
5,553 yuan in 1995, to 9,441 yuan in 2000, to 18,978 yuan in 2005, to 38,359 yuan in 2010 (China 
National Bureau of Statistics 2011, table 4-13). Considering that consumer price inflation in China 
has been negligible since 1998, most of the increase in the 2000s was real, after indexing for 
inflation. These increases have been more or less proportionate across provinces—much of the 
transfer payments described above would have been spent on financing such wages in poorer 
                                                          
51 These deficits have reached levels that would send the European 3 percent deficit ceiling into disarray. For 
example, in 2010, Sichuan, which had about 80 million people and a GDP worth US $280 billion at current market 
rates—roughly equivalent to the GDP of Greece—ran a provincial government deficit of almost 16 percent of GDP.  
52 Although these ‗western development strategies‘ are often characterized as targeting minority nationality areas, 
in reality, the large majority of people covered by them and receiving the majority of funds disbursed have been 
Han Chinese—not those residing in minority areas, but in traditionally Han areas such as eastern Sichuan, 
Chongqing, Shaanxi or Gansu. Such strategies have been related to policies aimed at building regional growth poles 
in places such as Chengdu in Sichuan, Chongqing, Xi‘an in Shaanxi or Lanzhou in Gansu.  
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provinces with fewer local fiscal resources. The increases have, in turn, arguably set standards and 
thereby affected wages in non-state formal corporate sector employment, where wages have similarly 
risen, and even in more informal categories of employment such as urban private units, urban self-
employment or unregistered categories of employment. While the phenomenon of rising wages 
among less privileged categories of workers in China is still hugely debated, and there is obviously a 
great risk of entrenching a polarized urban labour market, given relatively high levels of inequality, 
the relation of rising wages at the lower end of the labour hierarchy to publicly instituted state sector 
wage policies at the upper end has been given far less attention than the demand factors coming 
from coastal industries. Rising wages also need to be understood in terms of their synergy with 
efforts to broaden social security and public provisioning, including substantial increases in 
government expenditure in these policy sectors. The central Government has been pushing these 
measures forward as a central part of its strategy to address inequality and reorient the growth 
model towards a more sustainable foundation in domestic demand, despite enormous challenges, 
including very strongly entrenched vested interests.53  
The particular revolutionary setting of China would be nearly impossible, and perhaps not 
desirable, to reproduce in other countries today. But there is still much to be learned from 
underlying principles, shared with other less extreme cases, in terms of the ways off-farm 
employment was generated and supported by domestically controlled mechanisms of accumulation, 
wealth redistribution and universal social service provision—all pursued from a poor agrarian 
economic starting point. In drawing from these historical and contemporary examples, two 
important corollaries must be made. First, transitions to lower fertility, out of agriculture, and 
towards industrialization and urbanization began long ago for many countries, especially outside 
sub-Saharan Africa. It might not be appropriate for countries such as those in the Southern Cone of 
Latin America, which was already well in advance of the Republic of Korea in the 1950s, to draw 
from earlier East Asian examples or even from the particular context of China at present. Second, 
there is arguably an even greater need for strong redistributive mechanisms today, in part because of 
the faster speed of demographic transitions, and the more rapid speed of population growth despite 
faster fertility reductions. Moreover, even strong forms of national developmentalism, as existed in 
East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, can no longer be presumed to produce the same equalizing effects 
                                                          
53 In discussions with Linxiu Zhang, Deputy Director of the Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy at the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences in June 2013, she suggested that return migrations of people from the coastal areas back to 
their home provinces in interior and western China—and hence the tightening of labour market conditions in 
coastal China—have been influenced by health insurance and other social security reforms, particularly in Sichuan, 
where many of reforms have been piloted. While reforms have sought to overcome institutional residential 
rigidities of the past by integrating rural and urban areas, they nonetheless remain restricted to the province in 
question and are non-transferable across provinces.  
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via employment and local retention of value added as they might have in the past, particularly in a 
very globalized and neoliberal setting.  
Hence, the Gershenkronian principle arguably holds more than ever, although operationalizing 
it for most developing countries requires experimentation and discovery, rather than a replication of 
old institutional models. Nonetheless, short of radical shifts towards such principles, the 
predominant supply-side emphasis in contemporary mainstream development policy arguably 
exacerbates the dilemmas of informalization, casualization and effective underemployment of labour 
transitioning to urban tertiary sectors in the global South. Current mainstream approaches to social 
protection, which some have called a ‗revolution‘, are excessively limited in scope and ambition to be 
able to address these dilemmas, in part because they eschew anything other than a very limited, 
somewhat conservative approach to redistribution, namely, welfare for the poor with conditions.  
Conclusion: reflections on deepening progress 
This paper started with a discussion about how the social value of employment is inherently relative 
and subjective, derived from the sense of security and dignity that people perceive from particular 
social and economic settings, which in turn invariably adapt to changing contexts. We therefore need 
to focus on the conditions under which a sufficient and sustained perception of social value might be 
cultivated within particular employment settings, in a manner that is adaptive and resilient to the 
often profound structural transformations associated with socio-economic development. Doing this 
requires positioning the relative and subjective social valuation of employment within a broader 
understanding of the processes by which labour is organized, integrated, stratified, subordinated and 
valued within societies, and how these processes change through the course of development. This 
was explored in this paper by discussing: the changing nature of social need in the contemporary 
global context by laying out some stylized facts on population growth and labour transitions towards 
tertiary sector employment across the global South; the limitations of standard economics 
approaches in dealing with issues of employment creation and regulation in this context; a variety of 
alternative socially and institutionally embedded views that emphasize the social processes involved 
in the valuing and regulation of labour; and lastly, the increasingly important imperative for 
progressive redistributive mechanisms to serve as crucial institutional factors in meeting the 
contemporary development challenge of creating sufficient employment that would be deemed 
socially valuable and that would reinforce other human development gains, such as in education. 
Ignoring this redistributive imperative while striving for productivity increases might well exacerbate 
certain structural aspects of vulnerability that evolve alongside human and economic development, 
thereby undermining the social valuation of the objective or absolute gains made in human and 
economic development.  
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From this perspective, a few points can be made about the theme of the 2014 Human 
Development Report on development processes and policies that deepen human progress by 
reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing resilience. Before asking about the relevance of the social 
value of employment with respect to this theme, we need to first address the question of how we have 
come to value each other in our increasingly interconnected global economy and society. Deepening 
progress in this sense refers in large part to meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
This offers a very restrictive sense of achievement within a range of multidimensional absolute 
poverty targets. For instance, target one of the MDGs—lowering the global poverty rate by half from 
its 1990 level measured by a poverty line of $1.25 a day in purchasing power parity terms—confines 
notions of economic well-being to an absolute minimum level of subsistence, below which one would 
essentially starve. While originally drawn from an average of different national poverty lines in poor 
countries, which came to $1.08 a day in purchasing power parity terms, this poverty line has been 
associated with the notion of ‗absolute poverty‘, meaning that a person‘s income is insufficient to 
procure around 2,100 to 2,400 calories of food a day in addition to some minimal non-food essential 
necessities. Reddy and Pogge (2002) have contended that, in fact, this poverty line does not provide 
an accurate or consistent assessment of absolute basic needs. Other criticisms include the 
problematic issues of measurement (e.g., see Saith 2005, or Fischer 2010a, 2013a), issues of 
converting income to food (as per Sen‘s entitlement and subsequent capability approach) or else 
relatively trivial questions of consumer sovereignty (i.e., that poor people might prefer to spend extra 
income on entertainment rather than food, as highlighted by Banerjee and Duflo 2011). Beyond these 
critiques, there is an urgent necessity to widen the scope of ‗progress‘ and achievement in ways that 
embrace a more complex understanding of evolving social needs.  
As noted in the second section of this paper, social needs can be differentiated from the more 
general idea of social norms in that if they are not met, very real and hard constraints result that can 
involuntarily drive people into objective states of deprivation, such as through not being able to 
access necessary health care. This is in contrast to socially constructed or conditioned relative norms 
and subjective preferences, which can also have a compelling effect on people, but not necessarily out 
of hard constraints, such as feeling deprived if one does not own a television. For instance, the 
necessity of having health insurance in the United States has compelled people to accept otherwise 
substandard minimum wage employment, whereas the fact that young people do not envisage 
careers in agriculture, even if they could find well-paid employment in that sector, is related more to 
changing social norms. Even if people have enough income to avoid hunger and starvation, they can 
still face strong compulsions related to broader social needs, such as: changing educational needs for 
employment when the social norm is increasingly based on a floor of full primary enrolment, thereby 
raising the minimal threshold for socially acceptable schooling qualifications; changing health care 
needs in a context of rising costs, shifting institutional contexts of access, ageing populations or new 
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diseases; the needs of housing and transport, especially in contexts of urbanization; financial needs 
such as student loans, credit card debt or mortgage payments; or any other necessity for 
participating in society with a minimal degree of functionality, let alone dignity, relative to one‘s 
perceived social position.  
Even without entering the realm of multidimensional poverty measures and, instead, remaining 
within the space of money-metric poverty measures, the thresholds that would allow for a sufficient 
level of income or expenditure to meet such needs, and that would also reflect a substantive sense of 
inclusion into decent employment, without exploitation or bondage, are generally much higher than 
those currently used in the MDG dollar-a-day ‗absolute‘ poverty measures. The trends might also be 
divergent, particularly in a globalizing context with generally rising inequality over the last several 
decades—in contrast to the comparison of poverty lines of $1.25 and $2.50 a day in purchasing 
power parity terms, which essentially reflect each other. The incongruence between the urban 
protests that broke out in Brazil in 2013 over rising bus fares and observations of falling absolute 
poverty rates there is notable in this regard. 
To a certain extent, there are structural reasons for the gradual decline in the measures of 
absolute near-starvation deprivation. Productivity in the contemporary production of food and 
material stuff has increased to such an extent over the last century that substantial surpluses have 
been achieved even in the face of rising population. Real food prices—or the terms of trade for food 
relative to other goods—are at close to an all-time low in historical terms, despite the recent spike. 
Fuglie and Wang (2013) estimate that real food prices have fallen 1 percent a year between 1900 and 
2010 on average. Given rising productivity and the mass processing of cheap (and cheap quality) 
foods, combined with increasingly integrated international markets, it is understandable how the 
condition of poverty has gradually changed over the last century from one of food scarcity and 
starvation to one in which calorie sufficiency is relatively easier to secure, although not necessarily 
nutrition sufficiency. Other compelling social needs take over in precedence and possibly cause 
repressed food expenditure, which conventional absolute poverty lines would be ill-suited to identify. 
This latter point would be a counter-argument to the consumer sovereignty view postulated by 
Banerjee and Duflo (2011). 
Insofar as absolute poverty is restrictively measured as a minimal ability to procure food, not 
necessarily as an ability or decision to procure food in light of other social needs or desires, it is 
understandable how there would be long-term, secular decline in such poverty rates, as reflective of 
this transformation in the condition of modern poverty. If anything, in the face of global productive 
capacity, it is surprising that so much of the world‘s population still subsists under or just above such 
minimally defined poverty lines. Part of this is undoubtedly related to agrarian conditions in much of 
the global South, where peasant farmers struggle to get by on the low food prices received for their 
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output on small plots of land, if they produce a surplus, relative to rising prices in the range of other 
social needs, such as in health care and schooling, or else in inputs to production. Much is not related 
to agrarian conditions, however. For instance, when we speak of Bangladeshi women factory workers 
being ‗pulled out of poverty‘ by working for the equivalent of $38 a month producing clothing for 
Western brands, we are referring to this notion of minimally defined absolute poverty, which these 
workers and their families subsist only slightly above despite being integrated into value chains that 
generate enormous value at the retail end. In this sense, such workers are still living under the 
predicament posited by classical economists such as Malthus, Ricardo and Marx, who assumed that 
workers‘ wages would always be squeezed down to a level of subsistence, that is, subsistence 
minimally defined by the price of food. 
  Moving beyond these conceptions of ‗progress‘ requires thinking more broadly about poverty 
and vulnerability in at least three ways. The first entails a more sophisticated understanding of 
evolving social needs, particularly in contexts where post-primary schooling is increasingly an 
essential minimum requirement for people moving into urban areas and tertiary sector employment. 
Such social needs are intimately connected to inequality and relative to evolving social norms.  
Contributions by the late Peter Townsend offer some of the best elaborations of this idea of 
‗relative deprivation‘.54 As he points out, ‗relative‘ in this sense is to be distinguished from poverty 
lines merely determined as a percentage of average income, such as the European Union poverty 
line, which is set at 60 percent of national mean income, and is more a measure of inequality than 
poverty. Rather,  
‗Relativity‘ applies to both resources and to material and social conditions. Societies are 
passing through such rapid change that a poverty standard devised at some historical date in 
the past is difficult to justify under new conditions. People living in the present are not 
subject to the same laws and obligations as well as customs that applied to a previous era. 
Globalization is remorselessly interrelating peoples and their standards of living at the same 
time as inequalities are growing in most countries. There are, therefore, major objections to 
merely updating any historical benchmark of poverty on the basis of some index of prices… 
Poverty may best be understood as applying not just to those who are victims of a 
maldistribution of resources but, more exactly, to those whose resources do not allow them to 
fulfil the elaborate social demands and customs which are placed upon citizens of that society 
in the first place. This is a criterion which lends itself to scientific observation of deprivation, 
measurement and analysis (Townsend 2006, p. 21). 
                                                          
54 See an excellent overview in Townsend (2006). 
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The capability approach of Amartya Sen might be understood as making similar points, despite his 
debates with Townsend in the mid-1980s.55 In a development context, such relative deprivation 
therefore requires an understanding of the evolution of compelling social needs in a context of social 
and economic transformation, as noted above. 
Second, movements out of absolute poverty—and development transitions such as urbanization 
more generally—can in many cases exacerbate vulnerability rather than alleviate it, which raises the 
crucial issue of employment security in a context of labour transitions and the importance of 
matching such labour transitions with modern social security systems. In other words, movements 
out of poverty generally involve a streamlining of incomes, such as transitions from diversified, low-
productivity, but stable and resilient rural livelihoods, to incomes based on one or two wages, 
salaries or other sources of income.56 While the latter generally offer higher returns for labour, they 
also place employees in a more precarious, all-or-nothing condition, which in turn heightens the 
imperative for employment security. Rather than exacerbating insecurity through flexible or active 
labour market policies, public policy needs to first focus on creating conditions that enhance peoples‘ 
ability to transition with a relatively secure degree of autonomy, thereby facilitating their own 
livelihood strategies in response to socio-economic structural change. This perspective highlights the 
increasing importance of more universalistic forms of social security and social provisioning as 
counterparts to the transition of populations out of agriculture and rural subsistence conditions, not 
simply in preparation for negative economic events, but also for dealing with the increasing 
structural vulnerabilities associated with the disembedding of labour within capitalism. In this sense, 
social security regimes are integral to enhancing peoples‘ capabilities and societies‘ competencies 
within development transitions. 
The dark side of these transitions is that, when they take place through a forced 
commodification of labour, the resultant insecurity of employment might not even be associated with 
improved incomes, all things considered. This has often occurred in capitalist processes of 
development whereby labour is forced to become dependent on wage employment through the 
appropriation of land assets and/or bases for subsistence. Based on the classical experiences of 
capitalist transitions, it is often assumed that such processes of labour commodification will 
eventually lead to rising incomes and productive accumulation in the long term, even if dislocations 
                                                          
55 Despite Townsend‘s defence of a relative conception of poverty, he contends that the criterion of such relative 
deprivation ―lends itself to scientific observation of deprivation, measurement and analysis‖ (Townsend 2006). 
This is a more positivist position than that of Sen, who has argued, despite his defence of absolute conceptions of 
poverty, that the identification of essential functionings should be determined through democratic processes 
within communities. 
56 The understanding of diversified rural livelihoods is one of the generic insights coming out of the literature on 
livelihoods. The idea of streamlining was classically made by Tony Atkinson and also by Amartya Sen.  
The Social Value of Employment and the Redistributive Imperative for Development 
 
 
 2014 Human Development Report Office  
 OCCASIONAL PAPER 55 
 
in the short term can be very destructive to peoples‘ livelihoods. As discussed in the second section of 
this paper, however, great care must be taken in evaluating the value of lost subsistence and the 
contingent conditions that allowed for rising wages in the classical cases. As argued by Celso 
Furtado, these contingent conditions included strong working class mobilizations that were 
integrated into the broadening social base of nation states that were, in turn, at the apex of 
macroeconomic coordination of national economies. These conditions might not apply in 
contemporary developing countries, particularly given the increasingly complex coordination of 
international economic activities that has passed, to a large extent, from nation states to large private 
transnational corporations, as Furtado observed already more than three decades ago. While this 
should not be cause for deterministic pessimism, it is also a warning against naïve complacency 
regarding any natural tendency for a gradual broadening of national social security systems as 
developing countries become wealthier, as in the classical cases. Intentional and sustained political 
resolve is required to guarantee such outcomes. Furtado himself believed in the role of political 
activism as ―the necessary condition for the manifestation of creativity in the institutional sphere, in 
other words, for the creation of new social forms capable of reducing the tensions generated by 
accumulation‖ (Furtado 1983, p. 9). Pre-empting the capability approach, he argued from his own 
structuralist logic that development ―is no more than this: to enlarge the space within which human 
potentialities can be realised‖ (ibid, p. 8). 
Third, we need to think of vulnerability as a vertically occurring condition experienced 
throughout social hierarchies at all levels, not merely in the space of poverty or with reference to 
falling into poverty. This is especially important in a context of increasing human development, such 
as rising schooling levels and growing aspirations for social mobility in a context of urbanization. 
New nexuses of vulnerability can be revealed or exacerbated in such contexts, further up a social 
hierarchy, and well above the spaces identified by absolute approaches to poverty, whether income 
or multidimensional. They might not even be detected by standard inequality measures insofar as 
they occur in the middle of a social hierarchy. For instance, university graduates from families that 
can afford such education might face exclusionary pressures (such as through racial, cultural, 
linguistic or gender axes of discrimination) within the types of employment suited to their 
educational status, such as public or formal corporate professional jobs, rather than in lower strata of 
employment that would be filled by poorer and/or less schooled workers. Exclusions in this sense 
place downward pressures on elite and/or upwardly mobile people within their respective labour 
hierarchies. They might be very contentious socially and politically, even though not reflected as 
increasing poverty or inequality per se. As argued in Fischer (2008a, 2009a, 2011b, 2013b), 
exclusion and vulnerability in this sense need to be understood and evaluated relative to comparable 
cohorts of people, with similar levels of education and aspiring to enter similar sectors of 
employment. 
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This insight is important because vulnerabilities that do not necessarily lead to poverty still have 
very powerful effects on various social dynamics of social stratification or conflict, and hence on the 
social value that people perceive from employment in such contexts. Vulnerabilities experienced at 
the upper end of a social hierarchy are especially potent, given that they occur among politically 
active and powerful classes. Absolute and even relative indicators of poverty often tell us little about 
these broader processes because they focus our attention towards the bottom of a social hierarchy, 
which might be normatively justified but analytically partial. Refocusing attention towards a more 
holistic understanding of vulnerability counteracts the tendency to blame poor people for a variety of 
perverse social dynamics, such as riots, crime, inter-ethnic conflict, civil war, etc., that emerge across 
social hierarchies in response to intensifying insecurities, whether due to inequality or other causes. 
While poverty might play a role in many of these social dynamics, it is important—indeed, it is an 
ethical responsibility—to remember that middle classes and elites are also usually implicated, often 
in ways that surprise presumptions, such as when the aggrieved ‗poor‘ turn out to be middle class 
activists. Social theorists need to address how middle classes and elites themselves might face 
various forms of vulnerability that undermine their perceptions of social value, thereby fuelling 
politically powerful grievances.  
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